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BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND THE
NEW GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
by Alan J. Barton*
I. FORMS OF CORPORATE COMBINATIONS
This article deals with the application of the new California General
Corporation Law (GCL)1 to transactions by which, broadly speaking,
one corporation acquires another. Corporate acquisitions generally
take one of two fundamental forms-a transfer of assets or a transfer of
shares in exchange for some type of consideration. Each of these two
forms of acquisition can be accomplished by a transaction involving
either a transfer by operation of law (i.e., a statutory merger or consoli-
dation) or a transfer by conventional conveyance. A transfer by con-
veyance is customarily referred to as an acquisition of assets or an
acquisition of shares, although in reality a statutory merger or consolida-
tion also involves a transfer of assets or shares, albeit by statutory fiat.
While an acquisition may involve the exchange of any form of value by
one party for the assets or shares of the other, this article will focus
primarily on those corporate fusions in which securities are the medium
of exchange.
A statutory merger involves the fusion of one corporation, which
automatically disappears, into another, which survives. As a part of
this fusion there is an automatic transfer of all of the assets of the
disappearing corporation to the surviving corporation and an assump-
tion by the surviving corporation of all of the obligations of the disap-
pearing corporation. The shares of the disappearing corporation are
also automatically converted into shares or other securities of the surviv-
ing corporation or, in some cases, the shares or securities of a corpora-
* B.A., 1960 (University of California); LL.B., 1963 (University of California, Boalt
Hall). Member of the State Bar of California.
1. Law of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, § 7, [1975] Cal. Stat. - [hereinafter cited as Gen'l
Corp. Law and referred to as GCL]. This new General Corporation Law will take
effect on January 1, 1977. The general corporation law in effect before January 1,
1977 is referred to as "prior law." Code section references in the text are to the GCL.
Amendments have been made to the GCL prior to its effectiveness by A.B. 2849, re-
cently enacted, Law of Aug. 27, 1976, ch. 641, [1976] Cal. Stat. - [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Technical Amendments Bill]. To the extent that these amendments
affect business combinations, they are reflected in this article.
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tion controlling the surviving corporation. A statutory consolidation is
similar to a merger in that a consolidation involves a statutory fusion of
two corporations. However, the product of this fusion is not one of the
combining parties, but a new corporation which is automatically created
and succeeds to all of the assets and obligations of the consolidating
corporations. The shareholders of the combining corporations general-
ly become security holders of the newly created corporation.
In an acquisition of assets transaction, the acquiring corporation
issues its shares in exchange for the assets of the acquired corpora-
tion and assumes the obligations of the acquired corporation. The
transfer and assumption are accomplished by conventional instruments
of conveyance and contract which permit the transfer and assumption of
selected assets and obligations. This transaction is customarily followed
by the winding up and dissolution of the acquired corporation, which
includes the distribution of the shares received from the acquiring
corporation to the acquired corporation's shareholders in cancellation of
their shares in the acquired corporation. After the acquired corporation
has disposed of all of its assets and its liabilities have been either
discharged or provision for discharge has been made, the corporate
existence of this entity is usually terminated.
An acquisition of shares transaction is accomplished by the acquiring
corporation issuing its shares to shareholders of the corporation to be
acquired in exchange for outstanding shares of the latter corporation. In
a transfer of shares the acquired corporation will become a subsidiary of
the acquiring corporation and ordinarily will not disappear. Sharehold-
ers of the acquired corporation become shareholders of the acquiring
corporation. Since this type of transaction necessarily involves the
assent of each transferring shareholder of the acquired corporation, an
acquiring corporation cannot be assured of obtaining complete equity
ownership of the acquired corporation unless all of the shareholders of
the acquired corporation can be persuaded to accept the acquisition.
This is in contrast with an acquisition of assets or a statutory merger or
consolidation in which all of the shareholders of the acquired entity
continue as security holders of the acquiring entity.
II. P IOR LAW
Apart from its Corporate Securities Law, California's corporation
statutes historically have treated corporate acquisitions by establishing
requirements for director and shareholder approval of certain of these
19761
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transactions2 and by giving shareholders who dissent from a statutory
merger or consolidation transaction dissenters' rights,8 i.e., they can
cause their shares to be purchased for cash at an appraised value. A
brief description of the application of these requirements under the prior
law will serve as a useful framework to discuss the GCL.
Under prior law, statutory merger and consolidation transactions
require the approval of the directors and shareholders of both the
acquiring and acquired corporations. 4 Additionally, minority share-
holders of either corporation who dissent from the transaction can cause
their shares to be purchased for cash at an appraised value.5
In the case of a conventional acquisition of assets, prior law requires
approval only by the directors and shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion and the directors of the acquiring corporation.0 No approval of the
shareholders of the acquiring corporation is required.7 Minority share-
holders of the acquired corporation who.dissent from the transaction are
2. CAL. CoRp. CODB ANx. § 3901 (West 1955); id. §§ 4103, 4107 (West Supp. 1975).
3. Id. § 4300 (West Supp. 1975).
4. Id. §§ 4103, 4107.
5. Id. § 4300.
6. Id. § 3901 (West 1955). Prior law contains no specific requirement that the
acquiring corporation's board approve an acquisition of assets. However, this formality
is subsumed from the general requirements of prior law that the business and affairs of a
corporation must be controlled by the board of directors. See id. § 800 (West Supp.
1975). Naturally, the board may delegate authority to the officers over the day-to-day
operations of the corporation, but the authority to issue corporate securities for the
assets, liabilities, and business of another company is of such importance that it is clear
that a board must authorize such a transaction.
7. Some state courts have created the de facto merger doctrine in order to apply the
statutory formalities of mergers to acquisition of assets transactions that are in substance
and effect similar to statutory mergers. See, e.g., Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton
Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct.), affd per curiam, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960); Far-
ris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). But cf. Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959). In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., the court enjoined the
acquiring corporation from consummating a purchase of assets because the transaction
was in substance a merger that was not being accomplished in accordance with the stat-
ute, which included a requirement of approval by the shareholders of the acquiring cor-
poration. In that case the business of the purchasing corporation would have undergone a
radical change, the book value of each of its shares would have been reduced from $38 to
$21, and control would have been shifted to the stockholders of the acquired company.
In Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., the shares to be issued by the acquiring
corporation would have transferred control of that company to the sole stockholder of
the corporation to be acquired and the book value of each share of the acquiring
company would have been reduced from $32 to $23. The court held that approval by
the stockholders of the acquiring corporations was necessary to a valid acquisition.
Although there is no California decision applying the de facto merger doctrine, Justice
Traynor referred to it and cited Farris with approval in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,
1 Cal. 3d 93, 117, 460 P.2d 464, 477-78, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 605-06 (1969).
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not given dissenters' rights and are, in effect, compelled to accept the
securities of the acquiring corporation in exchange for their interests in
the acquired corporation.
8
Prior law contains no express requirements for a conventional acqui-
sition of shares. However, it is clear that this type of transaction
ordinarily would require the approval of the directors but not the
shareholders of the acquiring corporation.9 Since the acquired corpora-
tion is not a formal party in this type of acquisition, there is no
requirement that the directors of this corporation approve the transac-
tion. Additionally, there is no need for a formal vote of the sharehold-
ers of the acquired corporation because a conventional acquisition of
shares implicitly involves the assent of each exchanging shareholder.
Minority shareholders who dissent from this type of acquisition retain
their shares in the acquired corporation and are not given dissenters'
rights.
The application of these requirements can be illustrated by the follow-
ing examples which involve a combination of B, a large company, and S,
a company whose assets, sales, and earnings equal less than ten percent
of B's.
Example One. B can accomplish an acquisition of S without a vote
of B's shareholders by a conventional acquisition of the assets or shares
of S. S's shareholders will have to approve the transaction.
Example Two. The same result as in Example One can be accom-
plished without a vote of S's shareholders if S has sufficient authorized
and unissued shares. In such a case the roles are reversed and S
acquires the assets or shares of B. In this classic "gnat swallowing the
camel" transaction, S's shareholders will- suffer substantial dilution of
voting power such that control of S will shift to the shareholders of B.
While B's shareholders will have a vote on whether to "sell out" to S, S's
shareholders will not have to approve the transaction. Additionally,
notwithstanding the significant impact of the transaction on S's share-
holders, they will not have dissenters' rights.
Example Three. If B and S merge or consolidate, the shareholders
of both companies would have to vote on the transaction, and dissenting
8. The de facto merger concept should be equally applicable to protect the interests of
the shareholders of the acquired corporation. However, in Delaware the doctrine fares
no better for the attacking shareholders of the selling corporation. See Hariton v. Arco
Elect, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
9. This requirement would stem from the same provisions which impose a requirement
of board action to authorize an acquisition of assets. See note 6 supra.
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minority shareholders of both companies would have dissenters' rights.
Even though the impact of the transaction on B's shareholders is mini-
mal, B must call a shareholders' meeting, solicit proxies, and subject
itself to dissenters' rights demands in order to effect even a very small
acquisition.
Example Four. If the Example Three transaction is rearranged so
that S merges into a wholly-owned subsidiary of B, the shareholders of
B will not have to vote on the acquisition or be given dissenters' rights.
Example Five. Conversely, if B were to merge into a wholly-owned
subsidiary of S, S's shareholders would not have to vote on the transac-
tion or be given dissenters' rights, in spite of the significant impact of the
acquisition on S and its shareholders.
The above examples demonstrate that anomalies are created by the
prior law's preoccupation with the form of a business combination. The
protective mechanism of shareholder approval and dissenters' rights are
often withheld when the circumstances clearly compel a contrary result,
as in the case of the shareholders of S in Examples Two and Five.
Additionally, these mechanisms are sometimes applied when the inter-
ests being protected are not significant enough to warrant the delay,
expense, and complication incident to those rights, as in the case
of B in Example Three. In some cases, shareholder approval is
available but dissenters' rights are denied when there is no persuasive
rationale for making this distinction. In this respect, compare the
position of the shareholders of S in Example One if an acquisition of
assets is employed, with that of the same shareholder group in Example
Three. In both of these examples the effect on Ss shareholders is
identical. They will suffer substantial dilution in voting power and will
receive shares of a totally different enterprise.
In summary, prior law distinguishes between a protectible sharehold-
er interest and one that does not require protection by focusing upon
whether the shareholder's corporation is being acquired or is doing the
acquiring. In the latter case, the interest is protected only if a statutory
merger or consolidation is used. Although in the former case the
interest will be protected to some degree by requiring shareholder
approval, the more complete protection afforded by dissenters' rights
will be withheld unless the form of the combination is a merger or
consolidation. And in neither case will the prior law attempt to deter-
mine whether protection should be required by measuring the impact of
the transaction on the affected shareholder groups.
[Vol. 9
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111. THE NEW GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Introduction
The general theoretical treatment of business combinations under the
GCL is in one important respect similar to the prior law and in another
respect it represents a significant departure from prior law. The princi-
pal similarity is that, with minor exceptions, neither prior law nor the
GCL attempts to impose any quantitative or qualitative requirements of
substantive fairness for acquisitions.' 0 Both statutory schemes define
shareholder interests that deserve protection and then establish mecha-
nisms to protect these interests. These mechanisms are director and
shareholder approval and dissenters' rights.
The principal theoretical difference between the GCL and prior law is
that the GCL is generally more consistent both in its selection of
shareholder interests that deserve protection and in its application of the
mechanisms to accomplish that protection. One example will illustrate
this point. Under prior law, the shareholders of an acquiring corpora-
tion are not required to vote on an acquisition unless the form of the
acquisition is a statutory merger or consolidation." As noted earlier,
there is no logical basis for limiting the shareholder approval require-
ment to a merger or consolidation because the potential impact of an
acquisition on the acquiring corporation's shareholders will not vary
with the form of the transaction. The GCL recognizes that whether the
interests of an affected shareholder group should be protected and what
type of protective mechanisms should be available should depend on the
need for protection rather than the form of the acquisition transaction or
the status of the affected shareholders' corporation as the acquired or the
acquiring corporation.
In defining the shareholder interests that are entitled to protection,
the GCL begins with the general proposition that all business combina-
tions should be approved by the board of directors and shareholders of
10. One of the exceptions to this generality is the GCL requirement that in a merger
reorganization each of the shares of the same class of stock of each constituent
corporation must be treated equally in terms of the cash, property, rights, or securities
issued in exchange for these shares. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1101. In
addition, in a merger reorganization in which one constituent corporation owns more
than fifty percent of another constituent corporation, the GCL limits the type of con-
sideration that may be given for the non-redeemable common shares of the acquired
corporation to non-redeemable common shares of the surviving corporation or a parent
corporation. Id. See text accompanying notes 105-14 infra.
11. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 3900, 4107 (West 1955).
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
each of the corporate parties."2 The shareholders of each party are thus
protected both by their own judgment and the judgment of the board of
directors of their corporation. The GCL recognizes, however, that it
should not be necessary to have a corporation's shareholders pass on a
combination if the impact of that transaction on their interests would not
be significant. In such a case the shareholders' interests can be protect-
ed by the judgment of the board of directors.'"
In measuring the impact of a combination on a shareholder group,
the GCL focuses on the voting power these shareholders will be entitled
to exercise immediately after the transaction is completed. If after the
combination the shareholders of a party will own equity securities
representing more than five-sixths of the voting power of the continuing
corporate enterprise, the impact of the transaction on these shareholders
is viewed as being insignificant and they are not required to vote on the
combination. 14 Conversely, if the voting power of their equity securities
will be five-sixths or less, the impact is treated as significant. Share-
holders will also be entitled to protection against a modification of their
shareholder rights in a combination even if the impact of the transaction
on their voting power would not be viewed as significant.'5
The GCL is also more consistent than prior law in employing the
protective mechanism of dissenters' rights. In any case where the
impact of a combination on the shareholders of a corporate party is
viewed as significant, i.e., where they are given the right to vote on the
transaction, dissenters' rights will be accorded to the shareholders of that
corporation.'0 Dissenters' rights are also given to the minority share-
holders of the subsidiary in a short-form merger, although they are not
given the right to vote on the transaction.Y1
B. "Reorganization" and Other GCL Terminology
Before examining and analyzing the new legal requirements for busi-
ness combinations, a brief review of GCL terminology is necessary.
12. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 1200, 1201(a); see text accompanying notes
35-49 infra.
13. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201.
14. Id. § 1201(b); see text accompanying notes 48-61 infra.
15 Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 1201(c)-(e); see text accompanying notes 62-
67 infra.
16. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(a); see text accompanying notes 185-90
infra.
17. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(a).
[Vol. 9
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Like prior law, the GCL authorizes business combinations to be
effected by operation of law as well as by conventional conveyance.
However, the operation of law combinations permitted by the GCL are
limited to the regular statutory merger and the so-called "short-form"
merger. The statutory consolidation has been eliminated from the
acquisition statutory scheme because it was seldom used and even less
frequently needed. The GCL refers to a regular statutory merger as a
merger reorganization;18 to an acquisition of shares for equity securities
as an exchange reorganization;19 and to an acquisition of assets for
equity or debt securities as a sale-of-assets reorganization.2" The term
"reorganization" is derived from the Internal Revenue Code, and the
three types of reorganizations authorized by the GCL roughly corre-
spond to the type A, B and C reorganizations under that Code.
2
1
Section 181 of the GCL defines the three types of reorganization. A
merger reorganization is a statutory merger other than a short-form
merger.22  In general, the medium of exchange in a statutory merger
may be shares or debt securities, cash, or other property.23 A party to a
merger reorganization is referred to as a constituent corporation.24 The
surviving corporation is the constituent corporation into which the other
constituent corporation or corporations are merged,2 5 the latter corpora-
tions being termed disappearing corporations.2
A short-form merger is a statutory merger of a subsidiary into a
parent corporation where the parent owns at least 90 percent of each
class of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary. No vote of the
shareholders of the parent or subsidiary corporations is required to
accomplish a short-form merger, but the minority shareholders of the
subsidiary are given dissenters' rights.28
An exchange reorganization is an acquisition of the shares of one
corporation in whole or in part in exchange for equity securities of either
the acquiring corporation or a corporation that has control of the
acquiring corporation, where immediately after the acquisition the ac-
18. Id. § 181(a).
19. Id. § 181(b).
20. Id. § 181(c).
21. INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(C).
22. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 181(a).
23. Id. § 1101(d); see text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
24. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 161.
25. Id. § 190.
26. Id. § 165.
27. Id. 8H 187, 1110; see text accompanying notes 147-81 infra.
28. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1,§§ 1110, 1300(a).
1976]
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quiring corporation controls the acquired corporation.29 The term
equity security means any share or security convertible into a share
(whether or not additional consideration must be given) or any warrant
or right to purchase a share or convertible security." Control is defined
for purposes of sections 181, 1001 and 1200 as the direct or indirect
ownership of shares possessing more than 50 percent of the voting
power of the controlled party. 1 Otherwise, control means the posses-
sion, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a corporation.
3 2
Voting power is defined as the power to vote for the election of
directors but excludes the right to vote upon the happening of a condi-
tion or event which has not yet occurred.Y3
The definition of a sale-of-assets reorganization is the acquisition by
one corporation of all or substantially all of the assets of another
corporation, in exchange in whole or in part for either or both of the
following types of consideration: (a) equity securities of the acquiring
corporation or of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring
corporation, or (b) debt securities of either of these corporations if the
debt securities both have a maturity date more than five years from the
consummation of the reorganization and are not adequately secured.
84
C. The Shareholder Approval Requirement
1. The Requirement and the Required Vote
Section 1200 of the GCL requires that a reorganization be approved
by the board of directors of:
(a) Each constituent corporation in a merger reorganization;
(b) The acquiring corporation in an exchange reorganization;
(c) The -acquiring corporation and the corporation whose property
and assets are being acquired in a sale-of-assets reorganization; and
29. Id. § 181(b).
30. Id. § 168.
31. Id. 6 160(b).
32. Id. § 160(a). The origin of this definition is rule 405 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. 230A.5(f) (1975) promulgated pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
33. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 194.5. If different classes of shares are entitled
to vote as separate classes of shares for different members of the board, the determina-
tion of percentage of voting power is made on the basis of the percentage of the total
number of authorized directors which the shares in question have the power to elect in
an election at which all shares then entitled to vote for the election of directors are
voted. Id.
34. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 181(c).
'[ol. 9
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(d) The corporation in control of any constituent [corporation in a
merger reorganization] or [of any] acquiring corporation . . . [in an
exchange or sale-of-assets reorganization] and whose equity securities are
issued or transferred in the reorganization .... 35
The control corporation in subsection (d) is referred to in the GCL as a
parent party. Section 1201(a) provides that "the principal terms of a
reorganization shall be approved by the outstanding shares of each class
of each corporation the approval of whose board is required ... .
The effect of this section is to require the approval of a business com-
bination by the shareholders of the entity whose equity securities are
being issued, as well as by the shareholders who will be receiving these
securities in exchange for their shareholdings in another party to the
reorganization. The shareholder approval requirement with respect to a
corporate party is subject to an important exception discussed below for
reorganizations that do not have a significant impact on the voting
power of the shareholders of that party.
Prior law requires one shareholder vote to approve a merger or con-
solidation and another vote to approve sale-of-assets transaction. In the
former case the transaction must be approved by the holders of two-
thirds of the shares of each class of a company,37 while a sale-of-assets
need only be approved by a vote of the holders of shares representing a
majority of the voting power.3" The GCL generally establishes a single
shareholder vote for all forms of reorganization. Section 1201(a)
provides that a reorganization must be "approved by the outstanding
shares . . . of each class" of each corporation whose shareholders must
approve the reorganization. 9 The phrase "approved by the outstand-
ing shares" is defined in section 152 to mean the affirmative vote of a
majority of the outstanding shares of each class or series entitled to vote
on reorganizations, either by a provision in the articles or by the GCL. If
a corporation's articles require a higher percentage vote of any class or
series for approval of a reorganization, the reorganization must be
approved by this "super majority." 40 Section 117 requires that the vote
35. Id. § 1200.
36. Id. § 1201(a).
37. CAL. Cor. CODE ANN. § 4107 (West Supp. 1975).
38. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3901 (West 1955).
39. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201(a). Delaware law generally requires a
majority vote of the outstanding stock entitled to vote to approve a merger, consolidation,
or sale-of-assets, but in the case of a sale-of-assets the shareholder approval requirement
applies only to the selling corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(e), 271(a)
(1974).
40. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 152. The articles of a corporation may provide
1976]
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required by section 1201(a) be of each outstanding class of shares
irrespective of limitations or restrictions on voting rights.
Establishing a single shareholder approval requirement for all forms
of combination is an extension of the policy underlying the GCL that
the availability and application of protective mechanisms should depend
on the substance of the transaction. The GCL's selection of a majority
class vote appears to be something of a compromise between the prior
law's requirement for a two-thirds class vote for mergers and consolida-
tions and a majority non-class vote for sale-of-assets transactions. The
wisdom of adopting a majority rather than a two-thirds vote can of
course be debated, but it is impossible to prove that one is more logical
or beneficial than the other.
Proponents of a majority voting requirement contend that a two-
thirds voting requirement enables a small minority to dictate the affairs
of persons with almost twice their holdings. The criticism aimed at the
majority voting requirement is that it does not afford adequate protec-
tion to a large minority. This criticism of the majority vote in large part
should be obviated by the GCL's requirement that shareholders object-
ing to the action of the majority will be entitled to dissenters' rights.
Furthermore, for financial, tax, and accounting reasons very few reor-
ganizations will in fact be consummated if a sizable minority exercises
these rights.4
There are two exceptions to the provision that shares are entitled to
vote as a class or series irrespective of limitations on voting rights. First,
two classes of common shares that differ only as to voting rights will be
treated as a single class.42 The rationale for this appears to be that
neither class is viewed as having an interest requiring special protection
because the required approval must include the vote of shares without
regard to limitations on voting rights.43 The logic of this rationale is
questionable since it disregards the dilutive effect of a reorganization in
which voting securities will be issued on the voting power of voting
common shares. This power, which by hypothesis is unique to the
for the vote of all of the shares of any class or series, or of a larger proportion than is
required by section 1201(a). Id. § 204(a)(5). If the articles of a corporation grant
voting rights to holders of securities other than shares, see id. § 204(a)(7), all
references in the GCL to the voting of shares includes the voting of these securities. Id.
§ 111.
41. See notes 224, 310-25 infra and accompanying text.
42. Gen'! Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201(a).
43. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMrITEE ON THE REVISION OF THE COR-
PORATIONS CoDE 94 (1975); [hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY REPORT].
[Vol. 9
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voting shares, is surely an interest deserving of special protection vis-h.-
vis nonvoting common shares. It would have been more logical to
require a class vote by the voting common as well as an affirmative
vote by the holders of both classes of common treated as a single class. 44
The second exception to the general rule that shares are entitled to
vote as a class relates to preferred shares. No approval is required of
any class of preferred shares of the surviving or acquiring corporation or
any parent party "if the rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions
granted to or imposed upon such class of shares remain unchanged
.... "I' This exception is subject to two qualifications. It does not
apply if voting rights are granted to preferred shares in the articles. 46
Further, it has no application in a merger reorganization if the merger
agreement amends the articles under circumstances that would require
approval of the holders of the preferred shares.
The apparent purpose of the preferred share exception was to prevent
the holders of a relatively small class of shares from blocking a reorgani-
zation unless their special demands were met. Nevertheless, this is a
troublesome provision. It permits a reorganization to dilute or modify
the economic position of outstanding preferred shares without any ap-
proval of the holders of these shares. For example, the issuance of
another series of preferred shares that are senior on liquidation to
outstanding preferred shares does not, strictly speaking, change the
liquidation preferences of these outstanding shares. However, the crea-
tion of interests with a superior claim on the corporation's assets ob-
viously affects the economic position of these shares.
48
44. Perhaps the true rationale for requiring common shares to vote as a single class is
that it is highly unlikely that nonvoting common shares will be issued in view of the
strong policy of the California Commissioner of Corporations that common shares carry
voting rights. See CAL. ADM. CoDE § 260.140.1. In those few instances when
nonvoting common stock is issued it will be held by very few persons. If a class vote of
these shares were required, the few holders of these shares would therefore be able to
block a reorganization.
45. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201(a).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 1201 (c).
48. This example, of course, assumes that the corporation's articles authorize the
issuance of senior preferred shares. If an amendment to the articles would be required
for this issuance, the GCL would require a class vote of the outstanding preferred before
preferred shares with superior rights could be authorized. Id. § 903(a)(5). Even if
the corporation would not require an amendment to its articles to accomplish this, the
terms of the outstanding preferred shares, if carefully drafted, would often require a class
'vote as a protective device. Additionally, if the issuance of the senior preferred would
require qualification under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CoRP.
ConE ANN. §§ 25000-804 (West Supp. 1975), the California Commissioner of Corpo-
1976]
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Another instance of a possibly significant impact on outstanding pre-
ferred shares would be the issuance of common shares which would
dilute the conversion privilege of preferred shares.4 9 Denying preferred
shares the right to vote on a reorganization is inconsistent with the
GCL's general theory of affording protection to shareholder interests
that may be significantly and adversely affected by a reorganization.
This exception also does not square with granting nonvoting common
shares the right to vote on a reorganization. There is no rational basis
for giving special protection to the interest of a nonvoting common
shareholder but denying this right to a nonvoting preferred shareholder.
Another problem with the preferred share exception is that it applies
only to outstanding preferred shares of the surviving corporation, the
acquiring corporation, or a parent party. The outstanding nonvoting
preferred shares of the acquired corporation in a sale-of-assets reorgani-
zation and of the disappearing corporation in a merger reorganization
are given a class vote on the reorganization. Thus, the GCL distin-
guishes between a shareholder interest that is deserving of protection
and one that is not on the basis of whether the interest is in the acquired
or the acquiring corporation. This is an artificial distinction which can
lead to business combinations being structured so as to avoid a vote of
preferred shareholders when their interests are significantly and adverse-
ly affected.
2. The Voting Power Dilution Exception to Shareholder Approval
The GCL does not require shareholder approval of a reorganization if
the prospective impact of the transaction on the shareholders of a
corporate party will not be significant. The significance of impact is
ordinarily measured by the voting power that a shareholder group will
possess in the combined enterprise after the reorganization. In general,
if the shareholders of a corporate party before a reorganization will own,
immediately after the reorganization, equity securities representing more
rations would have the power to refuse to grant a permit unless he concludes that the
issuance of these securities is fair, just, and equitable to the outstanding preferred shares
as well as to other affected security holders. Id. § 25140(c).
49. Even carefully drafted anti-dilution provisions contained in the preferred share
contract do not afford complete protection against dilution of the conversion privilege.
The issuance of common shares will also affect the dividend and liquidation rights of
preferred shares to the extent that the holders of these shares are entitled to "participate"
in the dividend and liquidation distributions to be received by the holders of the common
shares.
50. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201(b).
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than five-sixths of the voting power of the combined enterprise, they will
not be entitled to vote on the reorganization. 51 The theory of this
exception is that a group of shareholders do not need the protection of
voting on a reorganization if they will possess the degree of ownership
and control in the combined enterprise represented by this substantial
level of voting power. Conversely, a lower level of voting power
represents a sufficient diminution in ownership and control to warrant
applying the protective device of shareholder approval.2
This exception, which appears in section 1201(b), focuses on the
shareholders of each corporate party immediately prior to the reorgani-
zation and the voting power that each of these shareholder groups will
have in the combined enterprise immediately after the reorganization.
Since in a sale-of-assets reorganization the equity securities issued will
initially be owned by the selling corporation, this provision takes into
consideration the equity securities of the combined enterprise that will
be owned immediately after the reorganization by any corporate party as
well as those owned by the shareholders of the corporate parties.53 The
ownership of equity securities in the combined enterprise by the share-
holders of the corporate parties will arise either as a result of receiving
the securities issued in the reorganization or owning securities in the
issuing entity immediately prior to the reorganization. However, in
computing the prospective ownership of shareholders of a corporate
party, equity securities owned before the reorganization as a shareholder
of another party to the reorganization will be disregarded. 4  This
51. Id. Compare id. with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1974), which eliminates
the requirement for approval by the shareholders of a surviving corporation in a statutory
merger if certain conditions are satisfied, including the requirement that the equity se-
curities issued or issuable do not exceed twenty percent of the shares of common stock
outstanding immediately prior to the merger.
52. See ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 93-94. The origin of this voting power
dilution test is the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock
Exchange, which require a listed acquiring corporation to obtain the approval of its
shareholders if the shares to be issued in a business combination are at least twenty per-
cent of its outstanding shares. NEw YoRK STocK EXCHANGE CoMPANY MANuAL § A15
(1968); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE CoMPANY GUrDE 10,032 (1969).
53. It is questionable whether in any transaction both a corporation and its sharehold-
ers will own equity securities of the combined enterprise immediately after the reorgani-
zation. In a sale-of-assets reorganization, the acquired corporation will initially own the
issued equity securities, but ordinarily these securities will not have been distributed to its
shareholders at the hypothetical point in time when the voting power of this group's
equity securities will be measured. Any voting securities in the combined enterprise that
are owned by the shareholders of the acquired corporation immediately before the
reorganization will be disregarded in determining their voting power immediately after
the reorganization. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201(b).
54. Id.
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prevents fortuitous or preconceived cross-ownership from distorting the
true dilutive effect of a reorganization on a shareholder group.
A shareholder group's prospective ownership of equity securities must
represent more than five-sixths of the combined voting power of the
combined enterprise (i.e., the surviving or acquiring corporation or a
parent party) in order to be denied the right to vote on the transaction.
This means that so long as a corporation proposes to issue less than twen-
ty percent of its outstanding shares in a reorganization, it will not have to
submit the transaction to its shareholders for their approval. Twenty
percent is the breakpoint because this percentage of a company's out-
standing shares equals one-sixth of the shares that will be outstanding.
Thus, the issuance of less than twenty percent will leave an issuer's share-
holders before the reorganization with more than five-sixths of the pro
forma voting power. The corollary of this proposition is that the
issuance of greater than five times the corporation's outstanding shares
to another corporation or its shareholders in a reorganization will deny
the prospective recipients of these shares the right to vote on the
reorganization.
For the purpose of the voting power dilution exception, warrants and
other purchase rights are excluded in determining each shareholder
group's prospective ownership of equity securities in the combined
enterprise."5 In computing the voting power of the combined enter-
prise, it is assumed that equity securities convertible into voting shares,
either immediately or in the future, have been converted but that
warrants and rights to purchase voting shares have not been exercised.0
Additionally, shares that are entitled to vote only upon the occurrence of
an event that has not occurred are not treated as voting shares in the
computation of voting power.57
55. Id. The excluded securities are "any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase
• . . equity securities ... ." Id. The exclusion of warrants and subscription rights
from the determination of dilutive effect can create an anomalous result. In a reorgani-
zation, a corporation can issue debt securities and warrants (exercisable by cancellation
of the debt securities) to purchase its shares in an amount which, if exercised, will result
in its shareholders before the reorganization owning shares representing five-sixths or
less of the voting power of the corporation. Since there is no immediate shift in
voting power, apparently the voting power dilution exception of section 1201(b)
would apply, and therefore no approval of the reorganization by this corpora-
tion's shareholders will be required.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 194.5. An example of this would be preferred shares that are given the
right to vote for the election of directors only if the corporation defaults in the payment
of a dividend or a sinking fund payment,
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The apparent purpose of excluding warrants and purchase rights in
computing a shareholder group's prospective ownership is to prevent a
group from being denied the right to vote on a reorganization by issuing
that group voting warrants or options with an exercise price that makes
the prospect of exercise highly remote.5 Treating convertible securities
as having been converted and warrants and purchase rights as not
having been exercised gives recognition to the dilutive effect of the
former and not the latter, but the logic of this distinction is open to
question. The probability of actual dilution from these types of securi-
ties depends not upon their form but upon the relationship of the
conversion or exercise price to the market price or value of the underly-
ing shares and the duration of the conversion or subscription right. For
example, if a corporation's common shares are trading at $10 on the
New York Stock Exchange, it would be fatuous to conclude that deben-
tures convertible at $15 per share are more likely to result in dilution
than warrants or options that expire in thirty days and are immediately
exercisable at $8 per share. 59
The section 1201(b) exception turns on the voting power of equity
securities to be owned by a shareholder group immediately after the
reorganization. Thus, any uncertainty over the number of shares that
will be issued in a reorganization or the voting power of the combined
enterprise immediately after the reorganization will complicate the ap-
plication of the voting power dilution exception.6" For example, if a
corporation makes an exchange offer for the outstanding shares of
another company, it cannot know the number of shares that it will
actually issue because it may not be able to predict with any degree of
certainty the extent to which its offer will be accepted. If the number of
58. See ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 94. See note 59 infra for a discussion of
the possible difficulty in classifying a security as a convertible security rather than as a
warrant.
59. It is not always clear whether a security is a convertible security rather than a
warrant or purchase right. The GCL defines "equity security" to mean "any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into shares ... ." Gen'l Corp. Law, supra
note 1, § 168 (emphasis added). An acquiring corporation could issue voting preferred
shares not entitled to dividends, with a nominal liquidation preference, and convertible
into common shares upon payment of cash equal to some multiple of the market price of
the common stock at the time of the reorganization. How would this security be
classified for purposes of section 1201(b)?
60. Only uncertainty over the number of shares that will initially be issued in the
reorganization creates a problem. Shares that will be issued in a reorganization in the
future on the basis of the acquired company's earnings or the market price of the shares
issued will not affect the application of section 1201(b) to that reorganization because
this section refers to ownership immediately after the reorganization.
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shares offered in the exchange is at least twenty percent of the offering
corporation's shares outstanding or deemed outstanding, it would seem
that the exchange could not properly be authorized without an appropri-
ate vote of the offering corporation's shareholders, notwithstanding the
fact that some degree less than 100 percent acceptance of the exchange
offer would not trigger the voting power dilution exception.
Additional problems in determining the application of the voting
power dilution exception arise because of the considerable time that may
elapse between reaching an agreement on the terms of a reorganization
and the consummation or "closing" of the transaction. Changes in the
capitalization of the corporate parties that occur during this period can
affect the prospective voting power of the various shareholder groups
and therefore affect the shareholder approval requirement. Thus, it
may be initially concluded that a surviving corporation need not submit
a merger reorganization to its shareholders because the number of
shares to be issued is under twenty percent of the shares outstanding and
deemed outstanding. Prior to the closing, the prospective voting power
of these shareholders can be diminished by a number of events. An
obvious example of diminution is the issuance of additional shares by
the corporation to be acquired, such as upon the exercise of employee
stock options immediately prior to the merger, or the reduction of the
market price of the surviving corporation's shares where the exchange
ratio is keyed to market price. Less obvious instances of diminution
arise from reductions in the capitalization of the surviving corporation
prior to the closing. Examples of this are redemption of convertible or
voting preferred shares, sinking fund payments on convertible debt
securities, issuer purchases of its own common shares, and events that
result in an increase in the conversion price of the issuer's convertible
securities."1 In view of these possibilities, the parties will have to
61. Typical anti-dilution clauses in convertible securities require a downward adjust-
ment in the conversion price if the corporation issues shares at a price less than the
conversion price then in effect. For the purposes of these anti-dilution clauses, the
issuance of other convertible securities, warrants or options will be treated as an
issuance of the shares underlying these other securities, warrants or options. Such a
hypothetical issuance may initially result in a reduction of the conversion price. How-
ever, the conversion price will often be readjusted upward after the expiration of any
unexercised subscription right attendant to the securities that produced the initial
adjustment. An upward readjustment of the conversion price will decrease the number
of shares that may be issued upon conversion of the convertible securities, and,
consequently, will produce a reduction in the voting power of the shareholders of the
issuing corporation before the reorganization.
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consider and carefully plan all prospective capitalization changes when
evaluating whether the dilution in voting power exception is applicable
to any corporate party.
3. Exceptions to the Voting Power Dilution Exception
There are three basic exceptions to the section 1201(b) exception to
the shareholder approval requirement. The general effect of these
exceptions is to require the approval of shareholder groups to a reorgan-
ization, irrespective of the degree of any dilution, where the reorganiza-
tion would create a change in shareholder rights that would normally
require shareholder approval. These exceptions arise if (1) the articles
of a surviving corporation in a merger reorganization are amended; (2)
the holders of any class of shares in a merger or sale-of-assets reorganiz-
tion receive shares of the surviving or acquiring corporation that have
different rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions than the shares
being surrendered; or (3) the shareholders of a close corporation re-
ceive shares in a corporation which is not a close corporation.
The first of these exceptions appears in section 1201(c). It provides
that in a merger reorganization approval of the outstanding shares of the
surviving corporation will be required if any amendment is made to the
articles of that corporation which would otherwise require such approv-
al. Typical examples of this would be amendments that increase the
authorized shares of any class, or create a new class of shares, or modify
the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of outstanding shares.
Generally speaking, the GCL requires that a majority of the outstanding
voting shares approve any amendment of the articles,62 but in some
cases there must also be approval by a majority of the shares of any class
affected by the amendment irrespective of any limitations on the voting
rights of this class.6"
Section 1201(d) contains another exception to the voting power
dilution exception. This qualification appears to be aimed primarily at
so-called "down-stream" or "upside-down" mergers. In this type of
transaction a corporation will take over a smaller company or combine
with a wholly-owned subsidiary in a statutory merger in which the
smaller corporation or subsidiary is the surviving corporation. This will
result in the shareholders of the larger company owning all or substan-
62. Genl' Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 902(a).
63. Id. § 903(a).
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tially all of the voting securities of the surviving corporation. The
application of the voting power dilution exception would permit a
modification of shareholder rights and privileges to be accomplished
without approval of the shareholders of the disappearing corporation. 4
Accordingly, section 1201(d) requires approval by the outstanding
shares of any class of a corporation which is a party to a merger or sale-
of-assets reorganization if the holders of shares of that class receive
shares in the surviving or acquiring corporation that have different
rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions than those surrendered. In
this connection, shares in a foreign corporation received in exchange for
a domestic corporation's shares will be treated as having different rights,
preferences, privileges, and restrictions.
Although a "down-stream" transaction is usually effected by a statu-
tory merger, section 1201(d) also extends to a sale-of-assets reorganiza-
tion. This means that shareholders of a selling corporation who receive
shares of the acquiring corporation"5 will be entitled to vote on the
reorganization if the shares have different rights, preferences, privileges
or restrictions than the surrendered shares, even though the shares
received will represent in excess of five-sixths of the voting power of the
acquiring corporation.6
64. This type of transaction was employed in other states to eliminate accrued and
unpaid dividends on preferred shares with cumulative dividend rights. See, e.g., Hotten-
stein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943). The preferred share
contract was often drafted to prevent cancellation of accrued preferred stock dividends
through amendment of the articles or certificate of incorporation unless the amendment
was approved by the holders of the preferred stock. However, the contract often failed
to protect these rights in the event of merger.
65. The use of the term "acquiring corporation" in section 1201(d) might enable a
down-stream transaction to be accomplished without a vote of the selling corporation's
shareholders who receive shares having different rights, preferences, privileges or restric-
tions than those surrendered. The GCL does not contain any definition of the term
"acquiring corporation," but this phrase appears in section 1200. It seems clear from
this section that the phrase means only the transferee corporation in a sale-of-assets
reorganization, and does not include the parent party of the transferee. If this meaning
is carried over into section 1201(d), it would appear that this section would have no
application to a down-stream sale-of-assets reorganization in which the transferor corpo-
ration's shareholders received shares of a parent party rather than of an acquiring
corporation. Thus, a corporation might organize a wholly-owned subsidiary under the
laws of another state and transfer its assets to yet another subsidiary of that newly
organized subsidiary. The transferor corporation could then distribute the shares of the
newly organized foreign subsidiary to its shareholders in cancellation for their shares.
See note 66 infra for a discussion of the shareholder vote that would be required to effect
such a distribution.
66. Since the application of this section seems to turn upon the receipt by the selling
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The scope of section 1201(d) appears to overlap section 1201(c)to
some degree. The latter section requires approval of a merger reorgani-
zation by the shareholders of the surviving corporation if that corpora-
tion's articles are amended in a respect that would require shareholder
approval. As noted earlier, such an amendment could accomplish a
reclassification of a class or series of securities of the surviving corpora-
tion. In such a reclassification, the holders of the shares of the class or
series reclassified would be receiving shares having different rights,
preferences, privileges, and restrictions. Thus, section 1201 (d) would
also come into play. However, the protective reach of section 1201(d)
in its application to a merger reorganization is broader than section
1201(c). The latter only operates if the surviving corporation amends
its articles, while the former applies if the shareholders of either party to
the 'merger receive securities having different rights. On the other hand,
section 1201 (c) requires approval by the vote required to amend the
articles, but section 1201 (d) only requires approval by a majority of the
class receiving shares that differ from the shares surrendered. Of
course, this distinction will be unimportant when a corporation has only
one outstanding class of shares.
The last exception to the voting power dilution exception, which
appears in section 1201(e), qualifies both that exception and the
section 1201(a) requirement that a reorganization be approved by the
holders of a majority of the shares of each class. If a reorganization
involves the holders of shares of a close corporation receiving shares of a
corporation that is not a close corporation, section 1201(e) requires that
the reorganization be approved by the holders of two-thirds of each class
corporation's shareholders of securities of the acquiring corporation, it is not clear
whether these holders would be entitled to vote on a sale-of-assets reorganization if the
selling corporation retains these shares and does not distribute them to its shareholders.
Under these circumstances, the selling corporation would become a holding company of
the acquiring corporation and its business. The shareholders of the holding company
would be left with their shares in that enterprise but may have less control over the
business that was sold because of its operation as a subsidiary.
If earlier shareholder approval of the reorganization is not required and if the shares
of the acquiring corporation are later distributed to the shareholders of the holding
company, it is not clear whether section 1201(d) would then require approval of the
original reorganization by the recipient shareholders. Distribution of the shares of the
acquiring corporation by the holding company would in all likelihood be viewed as a
winding-up and dissolution and therefore require shareholder approval. See Gen'l Corp.
Law, supra note 1, § 1900(a). However, the vote required in such a case might be less
restrictive than would be required for approval of a reorganization. Compare id. § 1201
(d) with id. § 1900(a).
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of the close corporation. 67  The articles of the close corporation may
provide for a lower vote but not less than a majority of each class. As
in the case of section 1201(a), section 117 requires that the section
1201(e) vote be of each class of shares irrespective of limitations or
restrictions on voting rights. The obvious purpose of section 1201(e)
is to prevent a reorganization from being used to terminate the close
corporation status of a company without the vote that would normally
be required to accomplish this end. Section 158(c) permits this status
to be terminated by an amendment to the articles approved by the
holders of two-thirds of each class, but the articles may deny any class a
vote on this subject.
4. Formalities for Obtaining Shareholders' Approval
The required approval of shareholders of a corporation may be given
before or after the approval of its board of directors.6 8 Subject to the
contractual rights of third parties, a board may abandon a reorganiza-
tion even after shareholder approval has been given without further
shareholder action.69 Shareholder approval may be accomplished either
by a vote at a shareholders' meeting or by the written consent of the
shareholders of the required proportion of the shares of each class
entitled to vote on the reorganization."0 The vote may be taken either
at an annual or a special meeting of shareholders,71 but in either case the
notice of meeting or any waiver of notice must state the general nature
of the proposal to be acted upon. 72 Additionally, the notice must
67. Section 1111 requires the same vote in any merger in which the disappearing
corporation is a close corporation but the surviving corporation is not, without reference
to whether the shareholders of the close corporation receive non-close corporation
shares. A "close corporation" is a domestic corporation with ten or fewer shareholders
that has elected to become subject to the close corporation sections of the GCL by
provision in its articles. Id. § 158(a). The purpose of the close corporation
provisions is to enable a corporate enterprise with relatively few shareholders to conduct
its affairs as a partnership without subjecting the shareholders to liability for corporate
obligations. For a summary description of these provisions see Barton, A Brief Look at
the New California General Corporation Law, 51 L.A.BJ. 211-12 (1975).
68. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1201 (f).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 603 (a).
71. See id. § 601(a).
72. Id. § 601(f). Section 1201(a) requires that the "principal terms" of the
reorganization be approved by the shareholders. Accordingly, in addition to the
requirement that the notice of meeting state the general nature of the proposal, any
proxy statement used to solicit proxies to vote on the reorganization at the shareholders
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summarize certain of the GCL dissenters' rights provisions if the excep-
tion to dissenters' rights for certain marketable securities is to be appli-
cable.73
If shareholder approval is to be obtained by written consent, either
the consent of all shareholders must be solicited or written notice of the
approval must be given to all shareholders entitled to vote who have not
given their consent at least ten days prior to the consummation of the
reorganization. 74 Any written consent may be revoked prior to the time
that written consents of the number of shares required to approve the
reorganization are filed with the secretary of the corporation .
7
Any form of proxy or written consent distributed to more than ten
shareholders of a corporation having at least 100 shareholders of record
must give the shareholder the opportunity to specify a choice between
approval and disapproval of the reorganization and to abstain from
voting on the transaction.7 6 A form of proxy must also provide that the
shares will be voted in accordance with the choice specified by the
shareholder. 77  These requirements do not apply to any corporation
with an outstanding class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193478 or whose securities are exempted
from such registration by section 12(g)(2) of that act.7 9  Furthermore,
failure to comply with these requirements will not invalidate-any corpo-
rate action, but may be the basis for challenging any proxy at a
meeting.8 0
meeting should contain a copy of the reorganization agreement or at a minimum a
complete and accurate summary of the principal terms of the reorganization. In this
connection, see Item 14 of Schedule 14A to the proxy rules of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F R. § 240.14a-1 to .14a-12 (1975), for a
description of the formal disclosure requirements in a proxy statement applicable to a
business combination involving a publicly held company subject to these rules.
73. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(b) (1).
74. Id. § 603(b)(1).
75. Id. § 603(c).
76. Id. H§ 604(a), (b).
77. Id. § 604(a). If a shareholder marks his proxy "abstain" with respect to the
proposal, the shares covered by the proxy may not be voted either for or against the
proposal. Id. § 604(b).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (1970); see Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 604(d). The
proxy requirements for issuers whose securities are so registered are governed by section
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and SEC Reg.
14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to .14a-12 (1975)
80. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 604(e). The superior court may compel
compliance with these requirements at the suit of any shareholder. Id.
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D. Statutory Merger-Requirements and Effect
Section 1100 establishes the authority for two or more domestic
corporations to "be merged into one of such corporations." The GCL
also permits mergers between domestic and foreign corporations if the
laws under which the foreign corporations are organized permit such
mergers.s ' The surviving corporation in such a transaction may be
either a domestic or foreign corporation, which will continue to exist
under the laws of its state or place of incorporation.8 2 If the surviving
corporation is a domestic corporation, the merger proceedings with
respect to that corporation and any domestic disappearing corporation
must meet the requirements either for a short-form merger or for a
merger reorganization between domestic corporations. 8 In the case of
a surviving foreign corporation, the merger proceedings with respect to
the survivor and all domestic constituents may be in accordance with the
laws of the state of incorporation of the survivor.8 4 However, the GCL
requirements for shareholder approval, dissenters' rights, and payments
for fractional shares will in any case apply to the domestic constituents,
and to any domestic corporation which is a parent party of any foreign
constituent.8 5
Like prior law, the GCL contains a series of formal requirements for
the accomplishment of a statutory merger between domestic corpora-
tions and between domestic and foreign corporations .8  The ensuing
paragraphs will review and analyze these requirements.
1. The Merger Agreement
The agreement of merger must be approved by the directors of each
constituent corporation. The agreement must include the terms and
conditions of the merger, any amendments to be made to the surviving
81. Id. § 1108(a). The term "corporation" is defined in the GCL as meaning a
domestic corporation organized under the GCL as well as a domestic corporation which
(1) is not subject to Division 2 or Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 or 6 of Division 3 of Title I of the
California Corporations Code on December 31, 1976, and (2) is not organized or
existing under any California statute other than the California Corporations Code. Id.
H9 102(a), 162. "Foreign corporation" means any corporation other than a domestic
corporation; this encompasses corporations organized in other countries as well as other
states and under federal laws. Id. § 171.
82. Id. § 1108(a).
83. Id. § 1108(b).
84. Id.
85. Id. H§ 1108(b), (e).
86. Compare CAL. CoRp. CoDn ANN. H9 4103-24 (West 1955) with Gen'l Corp. Law,
supra note 1, H9 1100-11.
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corporation's articles, the name and place of incorporation of the sur-
viving corporation as well as of each constituent corporation, and infor-
mation about the manner of share conversion and the type of value to be
received in exchange for such shares.s7 Each constituent corporation
must sign the agreement of merger by the signature of its chairman of
the board, president or vice president, and its secretary or assistant
secretary.""
The agreement of merger must contain any amendments to be made
to the articles of the surviving corporation,89 and the agreement must in
this respect comply with the requirements for establishing the wording
of amendments in certificates of amendment.90 Amendments to articles
that typically are made in connection with a merger include the authori-
zation of additional shares or a new class of shares to be issued in the
merger and a change in the corporate name of the surviving corporation.
In this connection, the GCL permits the name of the surviving corpora-
tion to be the same as or similar to that of a disappearing corporation.91
However, in changing its name the surviving corporation must comply
87. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1101. The merger agreement must state:
(a) The terms and conditions of the merger;
(b) The amendments . . . to the articles of the surviving corporation to be
effected by the merger, if any; . . .
(c) The name and place of incorporation of each constituent corporation and
which of the constituent corporations is the surviving corporation;
(d) The manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations
into shares or other securities of the surviving corporation . . . , [and] the cash,
property, rights or securities of any corporation . . . [to be received] in exchange
for such shares . . . ; and
(e) Such other details or provisions as are desired, ... including, . . . the
payment of cash in lieu of fractional shares ....
Id.
88. Id. § 1102.
89. Id. § 1101(b). The corporation's power to amend its articles as a part of a
merger is subject to section 900 which provides the general enabling power to a
corporation to amend its articles. Id.
90. Id. The requirements for wording of certificates of amendment appear in id. §
907. However, the last paragraph of section 905 substitutes the filing of a merger
agreement and officers' certificate, as required by section 1103, for the filing of a
certificate of amendment, in order to satisfy the filing requirements for an amendment to
articles incident to a merger reorganization.
91. Id. § 1101(b). This provision eliminates an obstacle created under prior law
by the California Secretary of State's refusal to file a merger agreement if it changed the
name of the surviving corporation to the name of a disappearing domestic corporation or
a disappearing foreign corporation that was qualified to transact intrastate business in
California. The Secretary based this policy on CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 310 (West
1955), which prohibited the Secretary from filing articles which set forth a name that
was the same as or similar to that of a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in this state. This policy could only be circumvented by
resorting to artifices such as a fictitious intermediary.
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with the GCL provision designed to prevent the adoption of misleading
corporate names.
The requirement that the agreement state the name and place of
incorporation of each constituent corporation and identify the surviving
corporation apparently has a two-fold purpose. It naturally serves to
identify the parties and their respective roles in the transaction, and it
alerts the office of the Secretary of State to the possible relevance of the
GCL provisions that are applicable to mergers between domestic and
foreign corporations.
The agreement of merger may be amended with the approval of the
boards of directors of the constituent corporations and, unless the
shareholder approval obtained included approval of the agreement as
amended, with the further approval of the shareholder groups entitled to
vote on the reorganization." At any time prior to the effectiveness of a
merger it may be abandoned by a constituent corporation at the discre-
tion of its board of directors and without further approval of its share-
holders.9 4 The statutory right of abandonment is not intended to
foreclose an action for breach of the agreement of merger either by a
party to the agreement or by a third party beneficiary. Accordingly, any
abandonment will be subject to the contractual rights of the other
constituent corporations as well as the rights of other third parties00
2. Permitted Consideration and Forms of Mergers
The agreement of merger must state what disposition will be made of
the outstanding shares of each of the constituent corporations. The
GCL specifies the following three possibilities: (1) the conversion of
shares of the constituents into shares or other securities of the surviving
corporation; (2) the exchange of shares of constituent corporations for
cash, property, rights, or securities of any corporation other than the
surviving corporation; or (3) a combination of conversion into shares or
other securities of the surviving corporation and the exchange of shares
for cash, property, rights, or securities of any other corporation.°0 While
not expressly stated in the GCL, an obvious fourth possibility is for the
shares of a constituent corporation to remain unchanged. The effect of
these possibilities is generally to permit the use of any form or combina-
tion of forms of consideration in a merger, as well as the accomplish-
92. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1101(b). The provision governing the adoption
of corporate names appears in section 201(b).
93. Id. § 1104.
94. Id. § 1105.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 1101(d).
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ment of three basic forms of merger, i.e., the straight merger, the
triangular merger, and the reverse merger.
In a straight merger, the company to be acquired is generally the
disappearing corporation which merges into the surviving corporation.
The shareholders of the former receive shares or securities of the latter.
In the triangular merger the acquired corporation is also the disappear-
ing corporation but merges into a wholly-owned subsidiary of the corpo-
ration whose shares or securities are issued to the shareholders of the
disappearing corporation. This form of merger is employed when the
acquiring corporation desires to have the business and assets of the
acquired corporation operated as a separate corporate entity. In this
form of merger, the subsidiary is the surviving corporation, but it does
not issue its shares or securities to the shareholders of the disappearing
corporation.
The reverse merger (sometimes called a "phantom" merger) is a
variant of the triangular transaction and is so named because the surviv-
ing and disappearing roles of the merging entities are reversed. 7  The
wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent party becomes the disappearing
corporation and merges into the corporation to be acquired, which is the
surviving corporation. The outstanding shares of the disappearing
corporation are converted into shares of the surviving corporation, and
the shares of the surviving corporation are exchanged for shares or
securities of the parent party. The result of this form of merger is that
the acquired corporation becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
parent party, and the shareholders of the acquired corporation become
security holders of the parent party.98  Since this form of transaction
does not disturb the corporate existence, assets, or liabilities of the
acquired corporation, the reverse merger is used when there is concern
that a transfer of assets, even if accomplished by operation of law, might
adversely affect contractual or other property rights or relationships of
that corporation.
The conversion and exchange requirements of the basic merger stat-
ute also enable a merger to be used as a vehicle for reclassifying the
outstanding shares of the surviving corporation and for distributing cash
or other property to the shareholders of the constituent corporations.
Examples of such a reclassification would be the conversion of a class or
series of preferred shares into shares without preferences or with differ-
ent preferences or rights and the conversion of common shares into
97. 1. EImutN, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 79 (1975).
98. Id.
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shares with preferences. Normally, it will not be advisable to utilize a
merger to reclassify shares of the surviving corporation unless the reclas-
sification is an integral part of the reorganization plan. Absent a
reclassification, which requires an amendment to articles, the voting
power dilution exception of section 1201(b) may enable the surviving
corporation to avoid submitting the merger to its shareholders for their
approval. Even if this approval is required, shareholders who dissent
from a merger and reclassification will be entitled to dissenters' rights.
These rights are not available to shareholders who dissent from a
reclassification effected by an amendment to articles absent a reorgani-
zation.99
There is no particular advantage under the GCL to distributing cash
or other property as an incident to a merger in which shares or other
securities are issued. Transfers of cash or other property to any share-
holder group will be subject to the statutory limitations on dividends and
other distributions to shareholders appearing in Chapter 5 of the
GCL. 00 Additionally, the distribution of cash or other property in a
merger involving the issuance of securities may have adverse tax and
accounting consequences. 10 1
3. Limitations on Merger Consideration and the Merger as a Device to
Eliminate Minority Interests
Prior law contained no statutory prohibition against using a merger or
consolidation as an instrument to eliminate or "squeeze out" dissident or
other minority interests in a corporation. As a consequence, the statu-
tory merger was employed as a squeeze-out device. 10 2 For example, the
99. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300.
100. Id. §§ 166, 500-03. See note 220 infra for a brief description of these
limitations. Prior law permitted the distribution of cash and other property in a merger
so long as the liabilities of the surviving corporation, including those derived from the
disappearing corporation, and its stated capital did not exceed the value of its assets.
CAL. CoRe. CODE ANN. § 4103 (West 1955).
101. See note 224 infra and text accompanying notes 310-25 infra.
102. Apart from merger transactions, two additional techniques were employed in an
attempt to squeeze out minority interests over their objection. One was a reverse stock
split of enormous proportion which left the minority shareholders with only fractional
interests in the new shares. These interests were then paid off in cash, thus completing
the squeeze-out. With the adoption of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968,
CALi. CoR. CODE ANN. §§ 25000-804 (West Supp. 1975), this type of transaction
became subject to the qualification requirements of that law, and accordingly this
mechanism cannot be employed without approval of the California Commissioner of
Corporations. CAL. CoR. CODE ANN. §§ 25103 (f)(3), 25120 (West Supp. 1975). The
second technique for eliminating minority interests, which has been prohibited by the
California courts, was a dissolution of the corporation in which the majority sharehold-
ers took the operating assets and the minority was given cash. See Zimmerman v. Tide
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majority shareholders of a corporation would exchange their shares for
the shares of another corporation. The second corporation would then
merge with the first corporation, and the minority shareholders of the
latter would receive cash or unattractive debt securities for their inter-
ests. Alternatively, a corporation would be formed by the majority
shareholders of a company, and a merger would be effected between
that corporation and the company with the unwanted minority. As in
the first type of transaction, the minority would receive cash or debt
securities and the majority shares. In a variation of the second type of
transaction, the majority shareholders of a corporation contribute their
controlling shares to a new corporation in exchange for all of the shares
of that company, thus creating a parent and subsidiary relationship
between the new corporation and the first corporation. In a merger of
the subsidiary into the parent corporation, the minority shareholders of
the subsidiary are given cash or debt securities, the shares of the
subsidiary held by the parent are cancelled and the former majority
shareholders of the subsidiary corporation become the sole shareholders
of that enterprise by reason of their shareholdings in the parent corpo-
ration.
The principal state law remedy for the minority shareholders in these
types of transactions was the exercise of dissenters' rights. But this
remedy only provided the minority with cash and did not prevent the
elimination of their interests in ,the corporation without their approv-
al.103 The drafters of the GCL decided to remedy the prior law's
insensitivity to squeeze-out devices by having the GCL circumscribe the
methods that can be employed to cash-out or eliminate minority interests
without their approval. Accordingly, the GCL reflects a rather clear
policy to permit the elimination of a ten percent or smaller interest in a
Water Associated Oil Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d 585, 143 P.2d 409 (1943); In re San Joa-
quin Light & Power Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 814, 127 P.2d 29 (1942). See also Efron v.
Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964), in which minority share-
holders successfully challenged the sale-of-assets of the corporation to a corporation con-
trolled by a majority shareholder of the first corporation. The sales price was equal to
fair market value but was payable in cash over an extended period of time, thus having
the effect of eliminating the interest of the minority in a profitable venture.
103. The statutory merger as a squeeze-out device has been held to be unlawful as a
breach of the fiduciary obligation of controlling shareholders to the minority sharehold-
ers. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974), discussed in note 168 infra; Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Los Angeles Super.
Ct. Case No. CA000268 Memorandum of Decision (Nov. 19, 1975), discussed in note
138 infra; accord, People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
This type of transaction has also been held to violate rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5
(1975), of the Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter cited as Rule lOb-5].
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2nd Cir. 1976), discussed in text at notes
117-22 infra.
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corporation, 10 4 but to proscribe the elimination of a greater interest.
The policy of prohibiting the elimination of larger minority interests
was implemented by limiting the type of consideration that may be given
in a statutory merger under certain circumstances. These limitations,
which appear in section 1101, are two in number. The first requires
that in a merger "each share of the same class or series of a constituent
corporation . . . shall . . . be treated equally with respect to any
distribution of cash, property, rights, or securities," unless all sharehold-
ers of that class or series otherwise consent.'0 5 This requirement as-
sures equality of treatment for identical securities and therefore pre-
cludes discrimination against minority shareholders as to the type of
consideration that is given for their shares. This requirement is subject
to three exceptions. It has no application to a short-form merger
authorized under section 1110.'6 Additionally, fractional share inter-
ests may be treated in the manner provided in section 407 without
contravening the equality requirement. 07  Finally, shares of the ac-
quired corporation held by the surviving corporation or its parent or a
wholly-owned subsidiary of either may be cancelled.0 8
The second limitation on the type of consideration which may be
given in a merger reorganization applies to a transaction in which a
specified control relationship exists between the parties to the merger.
The provision containing this limitation states:
[Tlhe nonredeemable common shares of a constituent corporation
may be converted only into nonredeemable common shares of the
surviving corporation or a parent party if a constituent corporation or
its parent owns, directly or indirectly, shares of another constituent
corporation representing more than 50 percent of the voting power of the
other constituent corporation prior to the merger, unless all of the share-
holders of the class consent . .. .19
Like the equal treatment requirement, this provision has no application
to short-form mergers and does not prevent the payment of cash for
fractional shares within the limitations of section 407.110 The principal
104. The permitted methods of elimination are the short-form merger, see text
accompanying notes 147-81 infra, and the reverse stock split followed by a payment of
cash for the fractional share interests. See note 145 infra.
105. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1101.
106. Id. See text accompanying notes 147-81 infra.
107. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1101. See text accompanying notes 241-45
infra.





effect of this provision is to require the exchange of nonredeemable
common shares for nonredeemable common share interests in a merger
reorganization between parties with the specified affiliation prior to the
merger unless all recipient shareholders consent to the contrary. No
limitation is placed on the type of consideration that may be exchanged
for preferred shares or redeemable common shares so long as the equal
treatment requirement is satisfied.
The affiliation that brings into play this common share exchange
requirement is the direct or indirect ownership of shares representing
more than fifty percent of the voting power of a constituent corporation.
The owning party must be either another constituent corporation or
a parent of that constituent. For purposes of section 1101 the "parent"
of a corporation means a person 1 who owns, directly or indirectly,
shares representing more than fifty percent of the voting power of that
corporation.11 2  Since the indirect ownership of shares of a constituent
corporation can create a parent relationship to -that corporation, the
parent of the parent of a constituent may or may not also be a parent of
the constituent. Indirect or direct parent status will depend upon the
percentage of the constituent's shares owned by its immediate parent as
well as the percentage of that parent's shares owned by the parent of
that parent.'13 In summary, the requisite controlling block of shares of
a constituent corporation that will trigger the common share exchange
requirement can be owned by any of the following persons: (1) the
other constituent corporation, (2) a parent of the other constituent
corporation, (3) a person who is both a parent of the parent of the other
constituent corporation as well as a parent of that constituent itself, and
(4) a corporation or other entity wholly-owned by any of the owning
persons specified in (1), (2) or (3). 11'4
111. The term "person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person. CAL. CoRp.
CoDE ANN. § 18 (West 1955). This definition appears in the general provisions of the
prior Corporations Code and was not modified by the GCL.
112. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 160(b), 175.
113. If the immediate (i.e., first) parent of the constituent corporation owns all of the
voting shares of the latter, the second parent's ownership of voting shares of the first
parent, even if only the minimum necessary for parent status, should also constitute
indirect ownership of shares possessing more than fifty percent of the voting power of the
constituent (i.e., 50.1% x 100% = 50.1%). However, if the direct ownership by the
first parent of the shares of the constituent and by the second parent of the shares of the
first parent are the minimum required for parent status, the second parent's indirect
ownership of shares of the constituent will not be sufficient for parent status (i.e., 50.1%
x 50.1% = 25.1%).
114. This conclusion is derived from the reference in section 1101 to direct or
indirect ownership by a constituent corporation or its parent of shares of another
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By requiring the exchange of nonredeemable common shares, section
1101 prohibits the immediate elimination of minority common share
interests which would be produced by the payment of cash or the
issuance of debt securities. The future involuntary elimination of these
interests is also precluded by the requirement that securities issued may
not be redeemable. Thus, the holder of a permanent common share
investment in a controlled corporation is assured that his investment will
be converted into a similarly permanent equity investment in the con-
trolling enterprise.
The common share exchange requirement contains one apparent
defect. It cannot be waived without the unanimous approval of the
holders of the class of shares that would be eliminated through the
payment of prohibited consideration. This seems unduly strict and
appears to go beyond what is necessary to protect minority interests. The
vast majority of the minority share interests in a merger may prefer debt
securities or cash rather than shares for their minority interests. How-
ever, a single opposing vote or, even more likely, the failure of any share-
holder to vote, will preclude -this, except insofar as cash can be paid upon
the exercise of dissenters' rights. This permits the holder of a single share
to dictate the type of consideration that will be received by the remain-
ing shareholders. It would have been more logical to permit non-
common share consideration for common shares in a merger involving
affiliates if the consideration were approved by the holders of a majority
of the shares of the corporation exclusive of shares owned by persons
affiliated with the paying corporation.
There may also be a defect in the GCL's application of both the equal
treatment and common share exchange requirements for mergers be-
tween foreign and domestic corporations. Section 1108(b) provides
that in such a merger, if the surviving corporation is a foreign corpora-
tion the merger proceedings may be in accordance with the laws of the
state of incorporation of that corporation. The same section specifically
provides for the application of the fractional share, shareholder approval
and dissenters' rights provisions of the GCL to the domestic disappear-
ing corporations, thus extending the protective features of these provi-
sions to the shareholders of the California corporations. However, there
is no similar provision which applies the equal treatment and common
share exchange requirements to such a transaction.115
constituent corporation. Ownership of shares by a wholly-owned entity would constitute
indirect ownership of the shares by the owner of that entity.
115. See note 291 infra for a discussion of the GCL's application of these protective
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The objective of the common share exchange requirement may be-
come embodied in rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion11 if the view of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp.11 7 is adopted by other federal courts. This case
dealt with the application of a New York long-form merger statute to a
"going private" merger. In this transaction the Weinstein family trans-
ferred its 68% interest in publicly-held Concord Fabrics, Inc. to defend-
ant AFW Fabric Corp. The family then sought to eliminate the minor-
ity shareholders by having Concord merge into AFW with the minority
to receive $3 in cash for each of their Concord shares. As the sole
shareholder of AFW, the Weinsteins would have owned the entire busi-
ness of Concord after the merger eliminated the minority interests.118
requirements to "pseudo foreign" corporations which are governed by section 2115 of the
GCL.
116. Rule lOb-5, supra note 103.
117. 533 F.2d 1277 (2nd Cir.), en banc rehearing denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (1976). In
denying the rehearing the court of appeals, per curiam, stated that rehearing en bane was
denied because of the confidence of the Second Circuit judges who, when polled, indi-
cated that this decision was of such importance that it would be heard by the Supreme
Court. 533 F.2d at 1310. The court also stated that it felt that an en banc hearing was
inappropriate in this case because two judges were disqualified from participating and
thus the law of the circuit might have been established with only the concurrence of a
minority of the acting judges. Id.
118. Concord Fabrics, Inc. had made a public offering of 300,000 shares in 1968 at
$15 per share, and in 1969 the Weinstein family, the controlling shareholders of
Concord, sold 200,000 shares in a secondary public offering at $20 per share. As a
result of these two offerings the holdings of the Weinsteins were reduced to approximate-
ly sixty-eight percent of Concord's outstanding shares, and the remaining approximately
thirty-two percent was held by the public. As a result of a severe decline in Concord's
earnings, corporate losses and stock prices, Concord's shares went from a high of $25 in
1969 to a low of $1 in 1974. Concord's operations became profitable again in 1973.
533 F.2d 1277, 1279.
In 1975 the Weinsteins decided to return Concord to a private rather than public
status by means of a cash tender offer for all of the publicly held Concord stock at $3
per share. The Weinsteins transferred their controlling interest in Concord to defendant
AFW Fabric Corp. (AFW) in exchange for all of the stock of AFW. AFW then ten-
dered for the publicly held Concord shares, and in its published offer advised the Con-
cord shareholders that after the offer expired AFW would cause a merger between Con-
cord and itself regardless of whether any shares were tendered. The public offer also
stated that the unpurchased Concord stock would be canceled with each minority share-
holder to receive $3 per share in cash for his canceled stock, and that in view of AFW's
sixty-eight percent interest in Concord the stockholders who did not tender their shares
would be unable to block the merger by voting against it. Id.
Plaintiff Marshel, a minority shareholder of Concord, brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to have the tender offer
enjoined. Id. Another minority shareholder brought a similar action in state court. The
AFW tender offer was withdrawn shortly after the institution of these actions, and AFW
proceeded with the merger phase of the going private transaction. The merger proxy
statement stated that the purpose of the merger was to return Concord to a private status
770 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
The Court of Appeals observed that the substance of the merger was
that, after having raised over $7,800,000 from public financings, the
Weinsteins sought to appropriate the entire public stock of Concord for
themselves at a cost to Concord of approximately $1,600,000.119 The
court held that,
when controlling stockholders and directors of a publicly-held corpo-
ration cause it to expend corporate funds to force elimination of mi-
nority stockholders' equity participation for reasons not benefiting the
corporation -but rather serving only ,the interests of the controlling stock-
holders . . . ,120
such a merger is a fraudulent scheme which violates section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934121 and rule 1Ob-5.
122
4. Filing Requirements
Section 1103 provides that after a merger is approved by the boards
of directors of the constituent corporations and the required shareholder
approval has been given, the merger is effectuated by the surviving
corporation's filing a copy of the merger agreement and an officers'
certificate of each constituent corporation with the California Secretary
of State.1 23  As a condition to this filing the disappearing corporations
and thereby cause the Weinstein family to be the sole stockholders of Concord. The
plaintiff Marshel amended his complaint in the district court to enjoin the merger on the
grounds that, inter alia, the merger violated rule lOb-5. The district court denied
Marshel's motion for a preliminary injunction, 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and
the court of appeals reversed this decision. 533 F.2d at 1278.
119. Id. at 1280.
120. Id. at 1281.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Section 10(b)].
122. Rule 10b-.5, supra note 103.
123. An "officers' certificate" is defined in the GCL as a certificate signed and
verified by the chairman of the board, the president or any vice president, and by the
secretary, the chief financial officer, the treasurer, or any assistant secretary or assistant
treasurer. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 173. The term "verified" means that the
statements made in the certificate
are declared to be true of the own knowledge of the persons executing the same in
either:
(a) An affidavit signed by them under oath before an officer authorized by the
laws of this state or the place where it is executed to administer oaths, or
(b) A declaration in writing executed by them "under penalty of perjury" and
stating the date and place (whether within or without this state) of execution.
Id. § 193. The officers' certificate must be attached to the merger agreement when
filed with the Secretary of State. It is required to state the total number of outstanding
shares of each class of the corporation entitled to vote on the merger, and the percentage
vote required of each class, and that the agreement in the form attached was approved by
that corporation by a vote of a number of shares of each class which equaled or exceeded
the vote required, or that the merger was entitled to be approved by the board alone
under section 1201. If equity securities of a parent of a constituent corporation are to be
issued in the merger, the certificate must state either that no vote of the shareholders of
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must first file with the Secretary a certificate of the Franchise Tax Board
to the effect that all taxes imposed by the Bank and Corporation Tax
Law have either been paid or secured.1 24 This certificate can usually be
obtained by the surviving corporation's presenting to the Franchise Tax
Board a written undertaking assuming all of the obligations of the
disappearing corporation to pay all taxes, interest and penalties owing or
to become due under that law.
The merger and any amendment to the articles of the surviving
corporation contained in the agreement of merger will become effective
upon filing the agreement of merger and officers' certificates with the
Secretary of State.'25 The effectiveness of a merger and any amend-
ments to articles is subject to two exceptions. Section 110(c) states that
an agreement of merger may provide that it will become effective up to
ninety days after it is filed with the Secretary of State.12 6 If the agreement
provides for a delayed effectiveness, it may be revoked and will not
become effective if prior to the specified effective date a certificate
revoking the filing executed on behalf of one of the constituent corpora-
tions is filed with the Secretary of State. 27 If no certificate of revoca-
tion is filed, the merger and amendment to articles become effective on
the date specified in the agreement of merger.1
2 8
Section 1103 permits the Secretary of State to certify a copy of the
merger agreement separate from the officers' certificates. Section 1106
provides that a copy of the merger agreement certified on or after the
effective date by an official having custody of the original has the same
force in evidence as the original and, except as against the state, is
conclusive evidence of the performance of all conditions precedent to the
merger, the existence on the effective date of the surviving corporation,
and the performance of the conditions necessary to the adoption of any
amendments to the articles contained in the merger agreement.
If the merger involves domestic and foreign corporations, the filing
requirements and effectiveness of the merger depend upon whether the
the parent was required or that the required vote was obtained. Id. § 1103. Compare
id. With CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4110 (West 1955).
124. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1103. This requirement only applies to
disappearing corporations that are taxed under the Bank and Corporation Tax Law. Id.
125. Id.
126. The origin of this provision appears to be DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (d)
(1974). In addition to providing for delayed effectiveness in the instrument, the party
submitting the instrument may request the California Secretary of State to withhold that
instrument from filing for a period, not in excess of ninety days from receipt. Gen'l
( orp. Law, supra note 1, § 110(a).
127. Id. § 110(c).
128. Id.
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surviving corporation is domestic or foreign. 2 ' If the survivor is a
domestic corporation, the agreement of merger and officers' certificate
of each domestic or foreign constituent corporation must be filed with
the California Secretary of State. Subject to section 110(c), upon such
filing the merger will be effective as to all domestic constituents, as in
the case of a merger between domestic corporations. 30 Although the
GCL is silent on this point, the merger will presumably become effective
as to the foreign disappearing corporation in accordance with the laws
of its jurisdiction of incorporation. However, if a foreign disappearing
corporation is qualified to transact intrastate business in California, the
filing with the California Secretary of State will be treated as an auto-
matic surrender of that right. 3 '
If the surviving corporation is a foreign corporation, the merger will
become effective as to the survivor in accordance with the laws of its
jurisdiction of incorporation. 32 A copy of the agreement, certificate, or
other document filed by the surviving corporation in that jurisdiction for
the purpose of effecting the merger must be filed with the California
Secretary of State. 3 3 The copy filed must either be an executed coun-
terpart of that agreement, certificate or document or must be certified by
the public officer having custody of the original. 3 4 Upon this Califor-
nia filing, the merger will become effective as to the disappearing do-
mestic corporations as of the time of the filing in the foreign jurisdic-
tion. 3 5 The filing will also be treated as an automatic surrender of the
right to transact intrastate business in California by any disappearing
foreign corporation that was qualified to transact that business. 3 If the
surviving foreign corporation is not so qualified it may be required to
qualify by reason of continuing the activities of the business or properties
129. Id. §§ 1108(b), (c), (d).
130. Id. § 1108(c).
131. Id. The prior law required a separate filing by the disappearing foreign
corporation to surrender its right to transact intrastate business in the state, CAL. CORP.
CODE ANN. § 4119 (West 1955).
132. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1108(d).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135 Id. Because the provisions of sections 1108(b) and (d) arguably allow only the
law of the surviving corporation's state of incorporation to control the effectiveness of
the merger, if the merger agreement provides for a deferred effective date and the
surviving corporation is a foreign corporation, there may be a question as to whether a
disappearing domestic constituent corporation may revoke the merger prior to its effec-
tive date under section 110(c). Presumably the merger agreement could in any event
expressly permit the disappearing domestic corporation to utilize section 110(c).
136. Id. CAL. CoRP. CoDE ANN. § 4119 (West 1955) also required the filing of a
separate certificate for this purpose.
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of a disappearing domestic corporation or of a disappearing foreign cor-
poration that was required to be qualified.
Unlike prior law, the GCL does not require that a copy of the merger
agreement or a certificate relating to the merger be filed with county
officials. 13 7 However, section 1109 permits county recordation for the
purpose of evidencing record ownership of the surviving or consolidated
corporation in all real property of a disappearing corporation in that
county. The scope of this section is interesting because it extends both
to mergers and consolidations wholly between foreign corporations,1
3 8
as well as to mergers involving only domestic or domestic and foreign
corporations. This section may be used if the laws of the state of
incorporation of any disappearing corporation, including California,
provide in substance that the making and filing of an agreement of
merger or consolidation will vest all of the real property of a disappear-
ing corporation in the surviving or consolidated corporation. The
document recorded will be either a certificate prescribed by the Califor-
nia Secretary of State or a copy of the agreement of merger or consolida-
tion certified by the Secretary or an authorized public official of the state
pursuant to whose laws the merger or consolidation is effected. The
document will be filed for record with the county recorder of each
county in which real property of a disappearing corporation is located.
5. Effect of a Merger
Broadly speaking, a merger accomplishes a legally produced fusion of
the constituent corporations. However, the precise effect of a merger is
governed by section 1107. This section describes the effect of a merger
on the existence of the disappearing corporation; the rights and respon-
sibilities of the surviving corporation with respect to the rights, property,
debts, and liabilities of the disappearing corporation; the rights of
creditors and lienholders of the disappearing corporation; and the status
of pending actions involving the disappearing corporation.'39
Section 1107(a) states that upon a merger the existence of a
disappearing corporation ceases and the surviving corporation succeeds
without other transfer to all of the rights and property of the disappear-
ing constituent.' 40 This succession is of course subject to the terms of
137. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 4114, 4119 (West 1955) mandated certain filings
with county officials.
138. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 4114, 4119 (West 1955) are of similar breadth.
139. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1107.
140. Id. This feature often eliminates the necessity of preparing and executing many
instruments of conveyance and transfer. Nevertheless, documents of title will ordinarily
require separate assignment, and negotiable instruments and documents will require
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contractual rights of the disappearing corporation. 4' Therefore, if an
agreement were to provide that transfers of rights by merger are in effect
void without the consent of the other contracting party, the agreement
would not be enforceable by the surviving corporation against the other
parties in the absence of the required consent unless the restrictions were
invalid. Since a merger does effect a transfer, albeit by statutory fiat, it
would not appear necessary for a restriction on transfer to make specific
reference to a merger for the restriction to apply in such an event.
Additionally, traditional contract law concepts affecting the assignability
of contractual rights undoubtedly apply to succession by merger.'42 The
certainty or uncertainty of the effect of these restrictions often dictates
the use of a reverse merger to preserve an advantageous contractual
arrangement such as a lease, supply contract, or loan which might not
be available if a transfer were effected. Since the corporation to be
acquired in this form of merger is the surviving corporation, a transfer is
avoided and the desired contractual relationship remains undisturbed.
This section also provides that the surviving corporation will become
subject to all debts and liabilities 4 3 of the disappearing corporation "in
the same manner as if the surviving corporation had itself incurred
them.' 1 44  This language seems to create more than an automatic
assumption of debts and liabilities, but the extent of its meaning is not
entirely clear. Perhaps it means that the creditors of the disappearing
endorsement unless they are in bearer form. Consent of the granting authority will
usually be required to effect a transfer of any franchises, licenses, and permits.
141. See Mercantile Trust Co. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Corp., 89 Cal. App. 558,
565, 265 P. 583, 585-86 (1928); cf. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wiborg, 59 Cal. App.
2d 325, 330, 139 P.2d 73, 75 (1943).
142. There is no California decision directly on this point. The issue was con-
sidered in Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 89 N.W. 580 (Mich. 1902) in
which, after a merger, the surviving corporation attempted to assert rights as a successor
under an employment agreement between the disappearing corporation and an employee.
The court applied ordinary contract law principles and concluded that the employment
agreement was not assignable and, consequently, that it was not transferred by the
merger. In the case of mergers involving state banks, however, the California legislature
has to a certain degree overridden ordinary contract principles on the assignability of
contract rights and the delegation of responsibilities. See CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 2095
(West 1968).
143. It is interesting to note that both the GCL and prior law refer only to the
survivor becoming subject to the "debts and liabilities" of the disappearing corporation.
Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1107(a); CAL. CoRu'. CODE ANN. § 4116 (West 1955).
In ordinary legal usage these terms would not necessarily encompass obligations created
by contract or law that do not directly involve a commitment to pay money. However,
the apparent intent of these statutes is to impose all forms of legal obligations of the
disappearing corporation on the survivor. The comparable Delaware statute contains the
phrase "debts, liabilities and duties." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1974).
144. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1107(a).
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corporation can enforce their claims against the survivor to the same
extent as if the survivor had itself incurred these debts.145 This would
appear to be a fair reading of the provision, but even this interpretation
might produce an unfair result. For example, if a surviving corporation
is treated as having incurred a debt, may it assert a valid defense to the
claim that could not have been asserted by the debtor disappearing
corporation?
Section 1107(b) provides that the rights of creditors and liens on the
property of both the surviving and disappearing corporations will be
preserved unimpaired. However, this provision states that liens on the
property of a disappearing corporation are limited to the property so
encumbered immediately prior to the effectiveness of the merger. Thus,
liens of creditors of a disappearing corporation will, after the merger,
extend only to the property they encumbered before the merger, irres-
pective of any after-acquired property clause in the security instruments
creating the liens. This restriction does not apply to liens on property of
the survivor, which by operation of such a clause may extend to the
property acquired in the merger. However, these liens will be subject to
any liens that existed on the acquired property at the time of the
merger.
46
Under section 1107(c), actions pending at the time of a merger
involving a disappearing corporation may be continued after the merger.
The survivor may either be substituted as a party for the disappearing
corporation or the action may be prosecuted to judgment without substi-
tution, in which event the survivor will be bound by that judgment.
6. Short-Form Merger
The short-form merger is a procedure for accomplishing the merger
of a substantially or wholly-owned subsidiary into a parent corporation
145. This appears to be the effect of Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App.
3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971), a decision involving CAL. CoRp. CoDE ANN. § 4116
(West 1955), the predecessor of GCL section 1107(a). In this case the court held that
the surviving corporation was liable for punitive damages arising from the pre-merger
activities of the disappearing corporation. Although the decision did not turn on an
interpretation of the language of section 4116, such as that suggested in the text, since
the party to be punished by the imposition of punitive damages was no longer in
existence, it is arguable that a mere assumption of liabilities would not have produced
this result. The Delaware statute is to the same effect as the interpretation suggested in
the text. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1974).
146. Under prior law liens carried over only to the property they encumbered immedi-
ately prior to the combination. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4116 (West 1955). This may
have conflicted with rights authorized under Division 9 of the California Commercial
Code. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9101 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
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without the necessity of obtaining the formal approval of the sharehold-
ers of either corporation. Other than California, the corporation stat-
utes of many states have permitted this procedure for some time, with
the minimum required parent ownership of the subsidiary ranging from
ninety to ninety-nine percent.147 Where the subsidiary is not wholly-
owned, the short-form merger is in substance a means of eliminating a
minority interest and is often accomplished through the payment of cash
for minority-held shares rather than the issuance of securities of the par-
ent. In those instances involving wholly-owned subsidiaries, the short-
form merger is a simplified procedure for eliminating unwanted subsidi-
ary entities.
Prior to the GCL, a short-form merger could not be used for Califor-
nia corporations unless the subsidiary was wholly-owned by the par-
ent.'48  Thus, any elimination of a minority interest through a merger
had to be accomplished by a regular statutory merger. Although this
required approval of the shareholders of ihe subsidiary, this was normal-
ly only a formality because the parent's ownership and influence made
approval a foregone conclusion. 4 9 Furthermore, approval of the par-
147. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974) (ninety percent ownership required);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP LAW § 905 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (ninety-five percent ownership re-
quired); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.66a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (ninety-nine per-
cent ownership required).
148. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4124 (West 1955).
149. A recent decision of the Los Angeles Superior Court in a hearing on a motion for
a preliminary injunction expresses the view that the prior law merger procedure in a
transaction similar to the procedure outlined in the text cannot be employed for the sole
purpose of eliminating minority shareholders. Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Los Angeles Super.
Ct. Case No. CA000268 Memorandum of Decision (Nov. 19, 1975). In this
case the trial judge granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the consummation of a
merger that would have resulted in the elimination of a publicly held ten percent
minority interest. Relying upon Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d
464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), the court concluded that it seemed likely that at trial it
would be held that the fiduciary obligations of the majority prevent the forced sale of the
minority's stock to the surviving corporation over the objections of the minority.
This decision is of particular interest in that the judge made reference to the GCL
regular and short-form merger provisions, admittedly not applicable to the case, because
the parties apparently attempted to draw different inferences from these provisions as to
the meaning of the prior law merger statutes. The trial judge observed that "[tihe new
Code does not do away with the idea that a 'merger' in fact must take place, nor does the
new Code purport to eliminate the fiduciary responsibilities of the majority to the
minority set forth in Jones v. Ahmanson, supra." Memorandum of Decision, at 6.
The judge's reference to the GCL's not dispensing with the requirement for a merger
clearly reflects a lack of familiarity with the concept of a short-form merger statute. It
should be noted that at the time of this decision the common share exchange requirement
for affiliated party mergers did not appear in the GCL. The Technical Amendments
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ent's shareholders could be avoided by having the subsidiary merge into
a wholly-owned subsidiary to whom the partly-owned subsidiary's shares
were transferred by the parent. If after the merger between its subsidi-
aries the parent desired to eliminate the wholly-owned subsidiary, this
could be accomplished-by a short-form merger.
As observed earlier under the discussion of the equal treatment and
common share exchange requirements, the drafters of the GCL decided
that the GCL should prohibit -the involuntary elimination of minority
shareholder interests except as permitted by the short-form merger and
payment for fractional share provisions.'6 0 Section 1110 authorizes a
short-form merger if the parent corporation owns at least ninety percent
of the subsidiary. The G(3L thus sanctions the elimination of a ten per-
cent minority interest in a short-form merger and protects the eliminated
minority shareholders by giving them dissenters' rights.
15 1
If a short-form merger involves only the absorption of a wholly-
owned subsidiary, section 1110(a) provides that it is effected by the
adoption of a resolution by the board of the parent corporation and the
filing of a certificate of ownership. The resolution must provide for the
merger and the assumption by the parent of all of the liabilities of each
merging subsidiary. If a parent owns less than all of the outstanding
shares of a subsidiary but at least ninety percent of the outstanding shares
of each class, the short-form merger will be governed by section 1110(b).
In such a case the short-form merger is effected by the adoption of
resolutions by the boards of the parent and subsidiary corporations and
the filing of a certificate of ownership. 5 ' The resolution of the parent's
board
Bill, which added this provision to the GCL, had not been introduced when this decision
was rendered.
150. See notes 105-15 supra and accompanying text.
151. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 1312(b), (c) provide the minority sharehold-
ers of the subsidiary with additional remedies and rights to protect their interests. See
text accompanying notes 225-40 infra.
152. Id. § 1110(d). If the disappearing corporation is a close corporation, id.
§ 158(a), but the surviving corporation is not, section 1111 requires that the
merger be approved by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of each class
of the outstanding shares of the disappearing corporation. However, the "arti-
cles . . . may provide for a lesser vote, but not less than a majority of the
outstanding shareholders of each class." Id. § 1111. It is not entirely clear whether
section 1111 is intended to require a formal vote by a close corporation subsidiary's
shareholders and thus override section 1110 (b) which dispenses with a formal sharehold-
er vote on a short-form merger. Since in a short-form merger the parent corporation's
ownership will by hypothesis exceed the vote specified in section 1111, a formal vote by
the shareholders of the disappearing corporation would be superfluous. Accordingly,
section 1111 should not be interpreted as overriding section 1110(b).
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shall provide for the merger, shall provide that the parent corporation
assumes all of the liabilities of each subsidiary corporation and shall
set forth the securities, cash, property or rights to be issued, paid, de-
livered or granted by the parent corporation upon surrender of each
share of each subsidiary corporation not owned by the parent corpora-
tion.15 3
The resolution of the board of the subsidiary must approve the fairness
of the consideration to be received for each share of the subsidiary not
owned by the parent." 4
The parent corporation may change its name as a part of the short-
form merger.155 This enables a corporation to employ this form of
transaction to amend its articles for this limited purpose without approv-
al of its shareholders. Unlike prior law, which only permitted the
parent to adopt the name of the subsidiary in a short-form merger,15 6
153. Id. § 1110(b).
154. Id. Compare this requirement of action by the subsidiary's board with DEL.
CODEI ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1975), which imposes no responsibilities on the
directors of the subsidiary. Professor Ernest Folk observes, that in a Delaware short-
form merger
the directors of the subsidiary have nothing to do with the merger. Thus they
need not obtain any impartial or independent appraisal of the value of the sub-
sidiary's stock, and since they have no "rights" with respect to the merger, they
have no duties to minority stockholders.
E. FOLK, Tm DErAwARE GENERAL CORPORAMION LAw-A CoNrvArY AND ANALYsis
352 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FoLK]. The GCL is diametrically opposite to the
Delaware code on this subject. The board of the subsidiary must approve the fairness of
the price paid to the minority, and in this respect the directors obviously must discharge
their duties as directors. See Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 309. GCL sec-
tion 310 contains a procedure for validating agreements and transactions between
corporations with common directors or between a corporation and another corporation in
which a director of the first has a material financial interest. Since it is distinctly
possible that a director of a subsidiary in a short-form merger may also be a director or
shareholder of the parent corporation, consideration should be given to the possible
applicability of section 310 to a short-form merger. Section 310 appears to be aimed at
assuring fairness to a corporate party in a transaction with an affiliate rather than
fairness to the shareholders of the corporate party. This is supported by a comparison
of the language of section 310 with section 1312(c) which deals with the fairness of a
business combination involving affiliates to the shareholders affected by the affiliation.
Section 1312(c) inquires into whether the "transaction is just and reasonable as to the
shareholders of the controlled party," whereas subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 310
require that the transaction be "just and reasonable as to the corporation." For these
reasons, it would appear that section 310 should not be applied to the action of directors
of a subsidiary approving a short-form merger. However, section 310(b) would apply to
action by the board of the parent corporation if any member of that board is also a
director of the subsidiary. Additionally, section 310(a) would apply if any parent
director had a material financial interest in the subsidiary.
155. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1110(c).
156. CAL. Conp. CODE ANN. § 4124 (West Supp. 1975).
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the GCL permits the parent to take any corporate name, including the
name of the subsidiary or a similar name. This right, of course, is
qualified by the requirement that there be adherence to the provision
designed to prevent the adoption of misleading corporate names. If a
change in corporate name is to be accomplished, the resolution adopted
by the board of the parent must establish the wording of the amendment
in compliance with the requirements applicable to certificates of amend-
ment.
157
The short-form merger and any associated name change becomes
effective upon the filing with the Secretary of State of a certificate of
ownership of the parent corporation together with a copy of this certifi-
cate for each disappearing corporation.'58 The delayed effectiveness of
filing provisions of the GCL discussed earlier'5 9 are also applicable to
the effectiveness of short-form mergers. As in the case of a filing to
accomplish a merger reorganization, a precondition to filing the certifi-
cate of ownership is the filing of a franchise tax clearance certificate
issued by the Franchise Tax Board for each disappearing subsidiary.160
The short-form merger may be utilized by a domestic parent corpora-
tion to effect a merger of either a domestic subsidiary or a subsidiary
incorporated in a state whose laws permit this type of transaction.' 6'
The parent corporation may also be a foreign corporation organized
under laws that permit short-form mergers of the type authorized by the
GCL, provided that at least one of the subsidiaries is a domestic
corporation. 62  But in such a case the only filing required is a certifi-
cate of ownership for each disappearing domestic subsidiary and each
157. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1110(c). The last paragraph of section 905
provides that the filing of a certificate of ownership pursuant to section 1110(d) will
satisfy the filing requirements for effecting the amendment to articles to change the
corporate name of the parent corporation.
158. Id. § 1110(f). The required officers' certificate must
(1) Identify the parent and subsidiary corporation or corporations.
(2) Set forth the share ownership by the parent corporation of each subsidiary
corporation as 100% ...or as at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each
class ....
(3) Set forth the resolution adopted by the board of the parent corporation,
including the resolution for change of name if applicable.
(4) Set forth the resolution adopted by the board of each subsidiary corpora-
tion, if required.
Id. § 1110(d).
159. See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra.
160. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1110(e). Of course the tax clearance
requirement only applies to subsidiaries that are subject to the Bank and Corporation
Tax Law. Id.
161. Id. § 1110(a), (b), (h).
162. Id. § 1110(g).
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foreign subsidiary qualified to transact intrastate business in Califor-
nia.1
63
If there were any minority shareholders of a subsidiary immediately
prior to the effective date of the short-form merger, the surviving
corporation must, within ten days prior to the effective date of the
merger, give written notice to these shareholders that the merger will
become effective on or after a specified date.' 64 This notice must
include copies of the resolutions adopted by the boards of the parent
and subsidiary, and information designed to apprise the shareholders of
their rights as dissenters, the procedure for asserting these rights, and
the price the parent has determined represents the fair market value of
their shares. 165 The minority shareholders are given the same dissent-
ers' rights as are accorded to shareholder groups entitled to vote on
reorganizations.
166
Since the adoption of the GCL and its short-form merger provision,
the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Green v. Santa
Fe Industries, Inc.167 has cast doubt on the use of state short-form
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1110(i). At the time of its adoption section 1110(i) only required that
notice be given to minority shareholders within ten days after the effective date of the
merger. However, since the adoption of the GCL the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F2d 1283 (2nd Cir.), en bane rehearing de-
nied, 533 F.2d 1309 (1976), held that the use of the Delaware short-form merger
statute, absent notice to the minority and absent a justifiable business purpose, constitut-
ed a violation of rule 10b-5 and section 10(b). Judge Medina reasoned that federal
courts are in part justified in finding a violation of federal law where minority share-
holders have not received prior notice of a merger and, therefore, are unable to seek
pre-merger injunctive relief. To meet this objection the Technical Amendments Bill
modified section 1110(i) to require that notice of a short-form merger be given to the
minority shareholders at least ten days before the effective date of the merger. The
Green v. Santa Fe Indus. case is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 167-81
infra.
165. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1110(i).
166. Id. See id. § 1300(a).
167. 533 F.2d 1283 (2nd Cir.), en bane rehearing denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (1976).
Rehearing was denied for the same reason given in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. See
note 117 supra for the court's reason for denying an en bane rehearing. In Green,
Forest Products, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe Resources, merged into Kirby
Lumber which was ninety-five percent owned by Santa Fe Resources. The merger was
effected in accordance with the Delaware short-form merger statute which, unlike the
GCL, permits either the parent or the subsidiary to be the surviving corporation in a
short-form merger. 533 F.2d at 1288. The merger resolution adopted by Forest Prod-
ucts provided that the minority stockholders of Kirby would receive $150 per share in
cash for their Kirby shares or could seek appraisal of their shares under the Delaware
dissenters' rights statutes. After the merger was completed, notice of the merger and a
financial information statement about Kirby were sent to the minority shareholders The
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merger procedures.168 Writing for the court, Judge Medina reasoned
information statement included an opinion of an investment banking firm to the effect
that if publicly traded, Kirby shares would trade at approximately $125 per share. The
information statement also contained the opinion of an appraisal firm valuing Kirby's
land and timber at $320 million. Id.
The plaintiffs, minority stockholders of Kirby, sought to have the merger rescinded
and money damages awarded because the minority shares were acquired by Santa Fe at a
grossly undervalued price. They alleged that on the basis of the appraisal report
included in the information statement the Kirby shares were worth at least $772 per
share. The plaintiffs also alleged that this undervaluation, coupled with Santa Fe's
failure to disclose the merger to plaintiffs until after it was completed and the fact that
the merger was effected without any business purpose, constituted a violation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, primarily on
the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a violation of rule 10b-5. Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Quoting with approval from
the principal Delaware decision on whether there must be a business purpose for a short-
form merger, the district court concluded that a business purpose is not required and
that lack of such a purpose would not violate rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation
of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure. The decision was Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962), and the language quoted by the district court from
this decision appears in note 168 infra.
The court of appeals reversed the district court in a decision with three separate
opinions, the opinion of the court, a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion. The
court reserved judgment on whether a charge of an excessively low valuation by itself
would allege a violation of rule 10b-5. 533 F.2d at 1291.
168. Before Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. state court decisions had uniformly
accepted short-form mergers as statutorily sanctioned methods of eliminating unwanted
minority interests, and rejected any notion that some business purpose beyond elimina-
tion must be shown. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del.
Ch.), affd, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); Rank Organ. Ltd. v. Pathe Laboratories, Inc., 227
N.Y.S.2d 562 (1962); cf. Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (I1.
1974). In Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court rejected an
attack on a short-form merger based upon breach of fiduciary duty by stating that
the very purpose of the [Delaware] statute is to provide the parent corporation with
a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise.
187 A.2d at 80. Using Stauffer and other authority, the district court in Green took
the view that
[t]he Delaware corporation law does not require that the merger be effected for a
business purpose. The statute reflects the public policy of Delaware with respect
to rights or splinter rights in corporations.
391 F. Supp. at 852. Contrary results are urged in VORENBERG, Exclusiveness of the
Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Hk.v. L. Rl-v. 1189 (1964) and Note,
Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 1630 (1961). These contrary
views were expressly considered and rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Teschner
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill. 1974). But cf. Jutkowitz v.
Bourns, Los Angeles Super. Ct. Case No. CA000268 Memorandum of Decision
(Nov. 19, 1975), which is discussed in note 149 supra.
The federal court decisions prior to Green were inconsistent although only one (aside
from the lower court opinion in Green at 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)) actually
dealt with a short-form merger. The only court of appeals decision was the Fifth
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that use by the majority of corporate funds in a short-form merger for
the sole purpose of eliminating the minority shareholders' interests in the
corporation was a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority
and that this breach constituted a fraud on the minority.',"
If Green becomes the law of the Ninth Circuit, the GCL short-form
merger provision will be useless in its application to subsidiaries with
minority interests. In evaluating whether this will in fact occur, it is
important to compare the GCL with the Delaware statutes in light of the
rationale of Green. First, Judge Medina noted that the sole remedy of
the plaintiffs under Delaware law was under the appraisal statutes. 170
Additionally, Judge Mansfield in his concurring opinion observed that
an appraisal remedy was inadequate when compared with federal re-
lief.17 ' This would not be the case under the GCL because dissenters'
rights are not made the exclusive remedy in any reorganization or short-
form merger involving affiliated parties. 72  So long as a shareholder
Circuit's opinion in Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). This case involved a regular statutory merger with the
minority receiving cash for their shares, and alleged violations of rule 10b-5. The court
concluded that compliance with the state statutory merger procedure would not be
sufficient if the transaction had no business purpose other than to eliminate the interest
of one shareholder. However, the case was disposed of solely on state law grounds.
Bryan was distinguished in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), in which the court found a business purpose for a minority
cash-out merger between a parent and a fifty-seven percent owned subsidiary. The pur-
poses advanced by the defendants and accepted by the court included cost savings from
the elimination of duplicate expenses (salaries, legal and accounting fees, stock transfer
fees, public relations expenses, directors' fees, and franchise taxes) and the elimination of
the inhibiting effect of potential claims of conflict of interest in transactions between the
parent and the subsidiary.
In Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the district
court concluded that a complaint by a minority shareholder whose interest was eliminat-
ed in a Delaware short-form merger stated a claim under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5. The complaint alleged that over a period of a
year certain defendants engaged in a scheme of deceit and concealment for the purpose
of squeezing out the plaintiff and obtaining his shares at less than their true value.
169. The court concluded:
We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule lOb-5 when it charges, in
connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the majority has committed a
breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting
the merger without any justifiable business purpose. The minority shareholders
are given no prior notice of the merger, thus having no opportunity to apply for
injunctive relief, and the proposed price to be paid is substantially lower than its
appraised value reflected in the Information Statements.
533 F.2d at 1291.
170. Id. at 1286.
171. Id. at 1297.
172. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § ,1312(b). See discussion in text at notes 226-
29 infra.
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does not elect to perfect his dissenters' rights he will not be precluded
from seeking legal or equitable relief for damage claimed to have
resulted from a short-form merger.
Second, the plaintiffs and the court in Green made much of the fact
that the short-form merger was completed without prior notice to the
minority stockholders who were thereby precluded from obtaining a
pre-merger injunction to halt the combination. 173 Unlike the Delaware
statute, the GCL requires that the minority shareholders be given at
least ten days notice prior to the effective date of the merger. 74 Thus,
premerger injunctive relief will be available in appropriate cases. How-
ever, it should be noted that the GCL does place limits on enjoining the
consummation of a business combination. These limitations require
that such an injunction may only be granted on ten days prior notice to
the corporation and only if the court determines that clearly no other
remedy will adequately protect the complaining shareholder or the class
he represents.
75
Third, both Judge Medina 76 and Judge Mansfield 177 were critical of
the tenor of Delaware's corporation statutes and particularly about the
ease with which these statutes could be employed to squeeze out minori-
ty shareholders. In contrast with Delaware law, the GCL establishes a
comprehensive framework for the protection of minority shareholders in
business combinations and thus reflects a firm state policy to restrict
transactions that have a significant potential for overreaching by control-
ling shareholders. As discussed earlier, the equal treatment and com-
mon share exchange requirements effectively preclude discrimination
against minority shareholders in merger reorganizations. 178 Moreover,
in a short-form merger, the board of the subsidiary must approve the
fairness of the consideration to be given to the minority shareholders.
This feature is without parallel in Delaware law.'
79
The nonexclusivity of the appraisal remedy in all combinations in-
volving affiliates will enable minority shareholders to maintain a class
action to protect their interests. One of the major benefits of this
procedural device was not available in Delaware state courts to the
173. 533 F.2d at 1292.
174 Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1110(i). See discussion in text at notes 164-65
supra.
175. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1312(b). See discussion in text at note 229
infra.
176. 533 F.2d at 1289.
177. Id. at 1295.
178. See discussion in text at notes 105-15 supra.
179. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs in Green because Delaware bars a shareholder who initiates an
appraisal proceeding from receiving compensation from inactive dissent-
ing shareholders. °80 Finally, the GCL requires that the parent corpora-
tion in a short-form merger, in any action to attack the merger or have it
set aside, will have the burden of proving that the transaction is just and
reasonable to the shareholders of the subsidiary.1
8
1
Will these procedural and substantive safeguards protect the GCL
short-form merger from the result in Green? It is too soon to know.
The Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court could decide that
any short-form merger statute is inherently fraudulent irrespective of
safeguards and therefore violative of rule lOb-5. This would be an
unfortunate result. State legislatures should be permitted to regulate
the conduct of controlling shareholders, and this regulation must include
the discretion to establish the standards for both permitted as well as
prohibited conduct. Where a state has concluded that a procedure for
the elimination of a ten percent minority interest, which contains reason-
able protective features, is lawful, it is improper for a federal court to




The purpose of dissenters' rights provisions is to afford shareholders
who disagree with a fundamental corporate change the opportunity to
liquidate their investment at its fair market value as an alternative to
being compelled to continue their interest in the changed enterprise. The
prospect of dissenters' rights being asserted in a transaction may also
have the incidental salutary effect of causing the terms of the transaction
to be attractive enough to minimize the actual assertion of these rights.
The dissenters' rights provisions may therefore be viewed as providing
additional protection to shareholders against unfair business combina-
tions.
180. See Raynor v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 317 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1974); Levin v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 194 A.2d 853 (Del. Ch. 1963). Both of these cases were cited in
footnote 4 of Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion in Green. 533 F.2d at 1297-98 n.4.
181. See Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1312(c). In this connection, it should be
noted that California courts have been appropriately sensitive to conduct by controlling
persons that has disadvantaged minority shareholders. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahman-
son & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Brown v. Halbert, 271
Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d
546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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Under prior law, dissenters' rights were only applicable to statutory
merger or consolidation transactions, and any shareholder of any con-
stituent corporation could assert these rights by following the statutory
procedure.'1 2  In contrast with prior law, the GCL extends dissenters'
rights to all forms of reorganization, but only shareholders of the
corporate party or parties whose shareholders must approve the reorgan-
ization are given these rights. 8 3 This means that the protection afford-
ed by these rights generally will be available only to shareholder groups
whose prospective ownership in the combined continuing enterprise will
represent five-sixths or less of the total combined voting power of that
enterprise. The GCL also extends dissenters' rights to the minority
shareholders of the subsidiary in a short-form merger.' 4
The wisdom of denying dissenters' rights to shareholders because they
do not suffer the specified level of dilution of voting power can of course
be debated. Yet it seems logical that these rights apply only to share-
holders whose interests have been affected in a significant respect. The
use of voting power dilution as the measure of significance has two
advantages. First, it may be easily ascertained with a minimum degree
of subjectivity. Second, it is a rational method of evaluating the impact
of a business combination on a shareholder of a corporate party. The
issuance of voting securities affects a shareholder's ability to influence
fundamental corporate decisions, and voting power dilution is a method
of measuring the reduction in this influence. Voting power dilution
may also be a rough approximation of the degree to which the combina-
tion will affect the business of the continuing enterprise.
2. Scope of Coverage
Dissenters' rights involve the right to require the corporation to
purchase for cash, at fair market value, shares issued by it that are
"dissenting shares" within the meaning of section 1300(b).' s8  These
rights do not apply to shares, such as certain preferred shares, whose
terms and provisions specifically set forth the amount to be paid in
respect of these shares upon the occurrence of a reorganization or
merger.
18 6
182. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4300 (West Supp. 1975).
183. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(a).
184. Id. See id. § 1110(i). These provisions actually extend dissenters' rights to
any shareholder of the subsidiary, but for obvious reasons these rights are only available
to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
185. Id. § 1300(a).
186. Id. § 1311.
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Section 1300(a) provides dissenters' rights in each of the following
circumstances: (1) in a reorganization, to each of the shareholders of
a corporation if approval of the outstanding shares of that corporation is
required under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 1201; (2) in a
reorganization, to each of the shareholders of a close corporation if the
holders of any class of shares of that corporation will receive shares in a
corporation that is not a close corporation; and (3) in a short-form
merger, to the minority shareholders of the disappearing subsidiary. In
a case where subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 1201 require approval
by shareholders of a corporation, section 1300(a) gives dissenters'
rights to all shareholders, even those who are not given a right to vote on
the reorganization.
18 7
Dissenters' rights are generally thought of as giving a shareholder the
choice between accepting shares or other equity securities on the one
hand or cash on the other. However, the GCL also extends dissenters'
rights to transactions in which the dissenting shareholders will have to
choose between accepting a specified price payable in cash or debt
securities and pursuing his remedies as a dissenting shareholder. For
example, cash is often given to the minority shareholders in a short-form
merger; and a sale-of-assets reorganization may involve the issuance of
debt securities.'8 8
The apparent purpose of treating an acquisition of assets in exchange
for nonconvertible, unsecured debt securities as a reorganization was to
give dissenters' rights protection to the shareholders of the selling corpo-
ration. If the debt securities are convertible or are issued with warrants,
the transaction will involve the issuance of equity securities 80 and
therefore will be a sale-of-assets reorganization. If no equity securities
are issued, there will be no reorganization unless the debt securities
issued have a maturity in excess of five years from the consummation of
the transaction and are not adequately secured.'90 The rationale for
187. Id. § 1300(a). The only shareholders who are denied a vote on a reorganiza-
tion when other shareholders of the same corporation are given a vote are holders of
certain non-voting preferred shares of the surviving or acquiring corporation or any
parent party. Id. § 1201(a); see discussion in text at notes 45-48 supra. Although
section 1300(a) clearly provides that the holders of these preferred shares will have
dissenters' rights, this section also specifies that these rights only apply to "dissenting
shares" as this term is defined in section 1300(b). Unfortunately, section 1300(b)(2)
requires that in the case of certain marketable securities the shares must actually be
voted against the reorganization in order to be dissenting shares. See discussion in text
at notes 205-06 infra. It appears, therefore, that the drafters of the GCL intentionally
or inadvertently deprived the holders of certain non-voting marketable preferred shares
of the safeguards of both voting and dissenters' rights.
188. Id. § 181(c).
189. Id. § 168.
190. Id. § 181(c). Where the acquiring corporation issues only "adequately se-
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this distinction based upon term and security, while not entirely clear,
appears to be that a shareholder needs more protection if he will receive
a long-term payout where there is an appreciable risk of nonpayment
because the payment obligation is inadequately secured.
3. Valuation of Dissenting Shares
Section 1300(a) provides that a holder of dissenting shares is entitled
to receive in cash the fair market value of those shares.191 Under prior
law the fair market value was determined as of the day before the share-
holder vote on the merger, but excluding any appreciation or deprecia-
tion resulting from the proposed combination. 92 However, it was often
difficult if not impossible to determine whether appreciation or deprecia-
tion in market value occurring prior to the shareholder vote was
attributable to the combination or other factors. For this reason the
GCL pegs the valuation of dissenting shares to
the day before -the first announcement of the terms of the proposed
reorganization or short-form merger, excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in consequence of the proposed action, but adjusted for
any stock split, reverse stock split or share dividend which becomes
effective thereafter.193
cured" or short-term debt securities, as to which repayment is presumably assured (i.e.,
the equivalent of cash), the provisions of Chapters 12 and 13 are not applicable. Thus,
the shareholder approval requirements of section 1001(a) (2) (majority non-class vote)
rather than of section 1201(a) (majority class vote) will be applicable, and the
recipients of this cash equivalent consideration will not be entitled to dissenters' rights.
One might properly inquire whether a debt security with a five year maturity is in fact
the equivalent of cash. Furthermore, the absence of a defintion of "adequately secured"
in the GCL may cause such a degree of uncertainty that practitioners will be unwilling to
rely upon the existence of security for debt securities to take a transaction out of the
reorganization category.
191. Id. § 1300(a). There is a paucity of Califon r on the meaning of
fair market value for purposes of dissenters' rig-hts. The one reported decision onthis
subject indicates that cosiderable weight should be given to the market price of actively
traded shares. Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 596
(1960). This view is buttressed by the GCL's marketable securities exception to
dissenters' rights. See text accompanying notes 198-206 infra. However, should the
trading market price be the overriding consideration if there is substantial divergence
between these values and underlying net asset values? In arriving at the fair market
value of dissenting shares, Delaware authorities require that consideration be given to a
number of factors including underlying asset values, earnings, market values, and
dividends. For a discussion of these authorities, see FoLK, supra note 154, at 380-87.
192. CAL. CoRP. CoDE ANN. § 4300 (West Supp. 1975).
193. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(a). The capital changes referred to in
section 1300(a) are those effected by the corporation that is obligated to purchase the
dissenting shares. Thus, a capital change by the surviving corporation or its parent party
will not affect the valuation of dissenting shares of the acquired corporation in a merger
reorganization. Section 1300(a) does not require an adjustment in the valuation of
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The statute does not specify which of the terms of a reorganization
must be included in an announcement in order to establish the valuation
date. Surely only the essential terms would be required. These are
probably the identities of the parties to the combination and a descrip-
tion of the amount and type of the consideration to be issued or paid for
the assets or securities of the company to be acquired."0 4 There is no
requirement that the announcement that establishes the valuation date
must formally emanate from any of the parties to the combination.
Disclosure of the terms of a proposed reorganization in the Wall Street
Journal as a result of an unauthorized leak of terms would appear to
satisfy the terms of the statute. The only questions would be whether
the unauthorized article contained the essential terms of the proposed
transaction and possibly whether the parties had reached agreement on
these terms at the time the article was published. 95  Even in the
absence of a published announcement, premature leaks about combina-
tion negotiations may produce trading activities that will affect the value
of shares for dissenters' rights purposes.' 96
On occasion it may be necessary to make a public announcement of
the pendency of acquisition negotiations before there has been any agree-
ment in principle on a combination. This will typically be done if there
is unusual trading activity in the shares of one of the parties and it is
believed that a leak about the negotiations may have occurred and may
dissenting shares for the payment of a cash or property dividend that occurs after the
announcement. However, it would be logical to require such an adjustment, particularly
in the case of an extraordinary distribution that significantly reduces the book or market
value of the dissenting shares.
194. Query whether an announcement of revised terms requires a new valuation date.
If the reorganization also involves a reclassification of or other share distribution on a
class of shares of the surviving corporation or a parent party, the terms of this
reclassification and distribution should also be in the announcement that establishes the
valuation date of the affected shares.
195. If the parties have not reached an accord on the essential terms, technically the
"terms of the proposed reorganization" do not exist. It is therefore arguable that a
premature announcement in such a case does not identify the valuation date.
196. Rule 10b-5, supra note 103, creates disclosure requirements and limitations which
will generally dictate that preliminary negotiations of a business combination be conduct-
ed confidentially. Premature disclosure can result in the dissemination of possibly
misleading information since negotiations may not have progressed to the point where
there is reasonable certainty that a transaction will occur on particular terms. In
addition, leaks of information about combination negotiations can result in trading
activity in which one party is acting on the basis of non-public information that is not
available to the other party to the trade. If trading activities of the latter type affect the
market prices of the shares of parties to the negotiations, they will also have a potential
effect on the values of these securities for dissenters' rights purposes. Thus the
importance of guarding against leaks is underscored by the GCL if the negotiations in
fact lead to a reorganization.
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have been responsible for this unusual activity. An announcement of
this type ordinarily will, of necessity, 'be somewhat general in nature.
Whether this will establish the valuation date will depend upon the con-
tents of the announcement and the status of the negotiations. If in fact
no accord has been reached, it would seem difficult for 'the announcement
to contain or to be viewed as containing terms of -the reorganization.
Nevertheless, such an announcement will ordinarily draw attention to
the shares of the named companies in the trading market, and may pro-
duce or be coincident with trading and changes in market values. If
the later formal announcement of the terms of the combination is treated
as the announcement contemplated by section 1300(a), the advantage
of pegging the valuation date to precede public announcement may be
lost. It may of course be argued that market changes following the
earlier release should be disregarded because they were produced by
the combination, but this requires the party asserting this proposition to
prove the element of causation, which the announcement concept was
designed to avoid.
4. The Marketable Securities Exception
As discussed earlier, the principal purpose of dissenters' rights is to
assure a shareholder who dissents from a proposed fundamental change
in his investment a choice between liquidating the investment at a fair
cash price or accepting the changed investment.197  This choice is
normally available, even in the absence of dissenters' rights, to holders
of shares for which an active trading market exists. In these cases
dissenters' rights are not needed to provide a shareholder with a reason-
able alternative to going along with a business combination to which he
objects.
For these reasons section 1300(b)(1) of the GCL withdraws dissen-
ters' rights from shares which immediately prior to a reorganization or
short-form merger were either "listed on any national securities ex-
change certified by the Commissioner of Corporations. . .or listed on
the list of OTC margin stocks issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System . . ... 19 The drafters of the GCL believed
197. See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text.
198. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(b)(1). These "listed" securities are
referred to in the text as "marketable securities." Delaware law contains a similar
exception to the dissenters' rights requirements for mergers and consolidations. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1974). The Delaware marketable securities exception
applies only to securities listed on any national securities exchange or held of record by
at least 2,000 stockholders. Id. However, this exception does not apply to any shares of
a constituent corporation if the holders of these shares are required by the merger to
1976]
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that the trading markets in these securities would provide adequate
liquidity to protect holders who oppose a combination. The national
securities exchanges referred to are those that the Commissioner of
Corporations has certified for the purpose of establishing the section
25100(o) exemption from qualification under the Corporate Securities
Law of 1968.191 At present, only the New York Stock Exchange and
American Stock Exchange have been certified.
There are two circumstances which will nullify the marketable securi-
ties exception to dissenters' rights. They bear on whether the theoreti-
cal liquidity of these trading markets will in fact be available to a
dissenter. The marketable securities exception will not apply to shares
if they are subject to a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer or
any law or regulation.20 0  Obviously the exception should not apply to
particular shares that are in fact not marketable because of a restriction
on transfer. However, this condition should be limited to a restriction
that truly impinges on a holder's ability to sell at a fair value rather than
one that establishes a procedure for sale. For example, if a holder can
only sell shares in accordance with rule 144201 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, this should not be viewed as a restriction if the
holder can satisfy the conditions of this rule as to his entire position
prior to the consummation of the reorganization.0 2
The second limitation on the marketable securities exception is that it
has no application to shares of a class if dissenters' rights demands are
filed with respect to at least five percent of the outstanding shares of that
accept as consideration for their shares anything other than: (1) shares of the surviving
corporation (with or without cash for fractional shares), whether or not these shares are
themselves listed or widely held; (2) shares of a corporation other than the survivor that
are listed or widely held (with or without cash for fractional shares); or (3) a
combination of (1) and (2). Id. Additionally, this section withdraws dissenters' rights
from the shares of a surviving corporation if the merger can be accomplished without the
vote of shareholders of that corporation by reason of § 251(f). Id. at 251(f) (Supp.
1795). See text accompanying note 50 supra.
-199. CAL. Cor. CODE Ar. § 25100(o) (West Supp. 1976).
200. Gen'l Corp. law, supra note 1, ,§ 1300(b) (1).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1975). This rule was promulgated under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S C.A.
§ 77a et seq. (Supp. 1976).
202. The fact that a Form 144 must be filed or an opinion letter delivered to the
issuer and its transfer agent does not affect the holder's ability to realize a fair price.
However, so long as the shares cannot be sold because of the quantity limitation or
holding period requirements of rule 144, the shares are not marketable and should not be
subject to the marketable securities exception. It should be noted that the restriction on
transfer condition refers only to restrictions imposed by the issuer or laws or regulations.
An agreement between a holder of shares and a third party restricting transfer, such as a
pledge to secure a bank loan, would not fall within this condition.
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class.203 In such a case the sale or threatened sale of so many shares
might depress the trading market for these shares, and dissenters' rights
would be necessary to enable holders of this class to realize a fair price
for -their shares. There is a procedural condition to the marketable
securities exception. Section 1300(b) (1) requires that the notice of
meeting of shareholders to act on the reorganization must contain a
summary of sections 1300-04, which define dissenters' rights and the
required procedure for asserting these rights.20 '
5. Dissenting Shares
Dissenters' rights only apply to "dissenting shares" within the mean-
ing of section 1300(b). This term refers to shares that meet all of the
following requirements: (1) they are not subject to the marketable
securities exception; (2) they must have been outstanding on the date
for the determination of shareholders entitled to vote on the reorganiza-
tion or, in the case of a short-form merger, must have been held of
record on the effective date of that merger; and (3) the dissenting
shareholder must have satisfied both the statutory demand and endorse-
ment requirements with respect to these shares.2 5
Except in the case of marketable securities, dissenting shares also
must not have been voted in favor of the reorganization.2 06  However, if
they are marketable securities then, without reference to the liquidity
conditions that nullify the marketable securities exception, they must
have been voted against the reorganization. The rationale for requiring
203. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(b) (1).
204. Id. § 1300(b) (1). The GCL technically requires that these sections be sum-
marized in the notice of meeting. In the case of a publicly held company, the notice
of meeting is typically the cover page of a lengthy proxy statement which itself includes
a descriptioa of the dissenters' rights procedure. Literal compliance with the require-
ment that the dissenters' rights provisions be summarized in the notice would entail
expanding the length of the notice considerably or treating the entire proxy statement
as the notice of the meeting. An alternative would be to include a prominent reference
in the cover page notice to that part of the proxy statement in which the dissenters'
rights procedure is discussed. Of course that discussion should include a summary of
sections 1300-04 of the GCL, and typically the complete text of these provisions will
appear as an exhibit to the proxy statement.
The obvious purpose of this requirement is to inform persons who may be entitled to
these rights of the procedure and circumstances under which they may be asserted. This
is particularly important because in order to perfect dissenters' rights for marketable
securities, should it turn out that the exception is not applicable, they must be voted
against the reorganization, id. § 1300(b) (2), and a written demand to purchase these
shares must be received by the issuer or its transfer agent not later than the date of the
meeting of shareholders to vote on the reorganization. Id. § 1301(b).
205. Id. § 1300(b).
206. Id. § 1300(b)(2)(i).
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a vote against a reorganization in the case of publicly traded shares is
to inform the issuer of the extent of the objections to the reorganization
and, consequently, of its potential exposure to demands for cash. Under
prior law, a publicly held issuer had no way of knowing which shares
that were not voted in favor of a merger would ultimately become
dissenting shares. This often necessitated more than a month's delay in
consummating a merger after shareholder approval in order to ascertain
whether actual dissenters' demands would exceed the limits specified in
the agreement of merger as a condition of the combination. Under the
GCL this delay can be avoided in the case of marketable securities.
Nevertheless, where shareholder approval of a reorganization is sought
by means of written consent rather than at a meeting of shareholders,
dissenters' rights of holders of marketable securities can be perfected
merely by not voting in favor of the reorganization. This exception for
written consent is needed to protect any shareholder whose consent was
not solicited.
6. The Dissenters' Rights Procedure
Section 1301(a) provides that if any shareholders of a corporation in
a reorganization would have the right under section 1300 to require
their shares to be purchased, the corporation must mail to its sharehold-
ers a notice that the reorganization has been approved by the sharehold-
ers. The notice must be mailed within ten days after the date of
shareholder approval. It must contain
a copy of Sections [1300-04], a statement of -the price determined by
-the corporation to represent the fair market value of dissenting shares,
and a brief description of the procedure to be followed if a shareholder
desires to exercise the shareholder's rights under such Sections.207
In the case of a short-form merger, section 1110(i) requires that a
similar notice be given at least ten days before the merger to the
shareholders of the disappearing subsidiary. Section 1301(a) also
provides that the required statement of price constitutes an offer by the
corporation to purchase dissenting shares at that price.
In order to exercise dissenters' rights, section 1301(b) requires that a
shareholder demand in writing that the corporation purchase his shares
for cash at their fair market value. The demand will not be effective if
the shares to be purchased are marketable securities unless it is received
by the corporation or its transfer agent by the date of the shareholders'
meeting to vote on the reorganization. In the case of other shares, the
207. Id. § 1301(a).
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demand will only be effective if received within thirty days after the date
of the corporation's mailing of the section 1301 (a) notice or, in the case
of a short-form merger, the section 1110(i) notice.
Section 1301 (c) requires that the shareholder's demand state the
number and class of shares held of record which the shareholder de-
mands be purchased. The demand must also contain a statement of
what the shareholder claims was the fair market value of these shares as
of the day before the announcement of the terms of the reorganization
or short-form merger.2 08 As in the case of the statement of fair market
value by the corporation required by sections 1301 (a) and 1110 (i), the
shareholder's statement of fair market value constitutes an offer to sell
his shares at this price. The shareholder's statement of value is a
departure from prior law which required only that the shareholder
request the corporation to state its view of the valuation of the dissenting
shares. 200  The GCL puts both the dissenting shareholder and the
corporation on a similar footing by requiring at the outset that each
express its view of valuation to the other and thereby be committed to
that valuation if it is accepted by the other party. The GCL is silent on
whether the shareholder's offer of sale terminates the offer of purchase
by the corporation and if not how long the shareholder may wait before
accepting the purchase offer. Similarly, there is no express provision
governing the time limit on the corporation's acceptance of the share-
holder's offer of sale. Additionally, it is unclear whether the corpora-
tion may unilaterally accept and bind the shareholder to his statement of
valuation but contest the status of his shares as "dissenting shares.
2 10
If the corporation and a dissenting shareholder agree that the shares
are dissenting shares and agree upon the price to be paid for these
shares, section 1303 requires the corporation to make payment for these
shares at the agreed upon price within thirty days after the agreement on
208. Id. § 1301(c).
209. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4301 (West 1955).
210. With certain exceptions, the remainder of the GCL dissenters' rights procedure is
quite similar to prior law. 'Under section 1302 a shareholder must submit for endorse-
ment the certificates representing the shares he demands that the corporation purchase.
The endorsement requirement of the GCL is similar to the prior law requirement. CAL.
CORP. CODE ANN. § 4302 (West 1955). The certificates must be submitted to the corpo-
ration or its transfer agent within thirty days after the date on which the section 1301(a)
or section 1110(i) notice was mailed to the shareholders. The certificates will be
stamped or endorsed with a statement that the shares are dissenting shares, or will be
exchanged for new certificates of the same denominations containing the stamped or en-
dorsed statement. Upon the registration of transfers of these shares the new certificates
will bear the same statement and the name of the original dissenting shareholder. Gen'l
Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1302
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price has been reached.21' Upon surrender of the certificates represent-
ing the dissenting shares, the dissenting shareholder will be entitled to
the agreed upon price together with interest at the legal rate from the
date of the agreement. The dissenting shareholder and corporation may
by agreement extend or shorten the time for the payment of the agreed
upon price for the dissenting shares.
If the corporation denies that shares are dissenting shares or is unable
to reach agreement with the shareholder as to the fair market value of
these shares, section 1304(a) permits these issues to be resolved by the
institution of judicial proceedings either by the dissenting shareholder or
by any interested corporation. A complaint to institute these proceed-
ings must be filed within six months after the date on which the section
1301(a) or section 1110(i) notice was mailed to the shareholder, but
not thereafter.21 2 If neither a corporation nor a dissenting shareholder
files such a complaint or intervenes in a pending action by or against
another dissenting shareholder during this six-month period, the hold-
er's shares will lose their status as dissenting shares and he will no longer
have the right to require the corporation to purchase them.2 18 If any
litigation is instituted to test the sufficiency or regularity of the votes of
the shareholders in authorizing a reorganization, any judicial proceed-
ings to resolve dissenters' rights issues will be suspended until a final
determination of this litigation. 14
In a judicial action involving the resolution of dissenters' rights issues,
two or more dissenting shareholders may join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants and two or more of these actions may be consolidated into
one action. 15 If the status of shares as dissenting shares is in issue, the
court first will determine that issue and then determine the fair market
value of dissenting shares if valuation is in issue.216 Valuation will
either be determined by the court directly or the court will appoint one
211. This requirement is similar to prior law. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 4304-
05 (West 1955).
212. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1304(a). This is almost identical in substance
to prior law. See CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4306(c) (West 1955).
213. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1309(c). This is almost identical in substance
to prior law. See CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4316(c) (West 1955).
214. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, 1 1310. This is almost identical in substance to
prior law. See CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4317 (West 1955).
215. Gen1 Corp. aw, supra note 1, § 1304(b). This is identical to CAL. CORP. CODE
ANN. § 4307 (West 1955).
216. Gen'l Corp. aw, supra note 1, § 1304(c). Cf. CAL. Con,. CODn ANN. §
4308 (West 1955).
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or more impartial appraisers to determine the fair market value of the
shares.
21 7
Under section 1305(e) the court is empowered to assess or apportion
the costs of the action against or among the parties to the proceeding
as the court considers equitable. However, if the value awarded by
the court is more than 125 percent of the price offered by the corpora-
tion, the court may require the corporation to pay not only the costs of
the proceeding, but also the dissenting shareholder's attorneys' fees, fees
of expert witnesses, and interest on the purchase price.215 This is a new
requirement and will probably put additional pressure on corporations
to reach agreement with dissenting shareholders as to the fair market
value of dissenting shares.
Section 1309 provides that dissenting shares lose their status as
dissenting shares and the holders cease to be dissenting shareholders and
will not be entitled to require the corporation to purchase their shares in
any of the following circumstances: (1) the corporation abandons the
reorganization; (2) the shares are transferred prior to their submission
for endorsement or are surrendered for conversion into shares of another
class in accordance with the articles; (3) judicial proceedings to resolve
dissenters' rights issues are not commenced within the six-month period
217. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1304(c). Prior law section 4308 required the
court to appoint three appraisers. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4308 (West 1955).
The report of appraisers will be filed with the clerk of the court, and "on the motion
of any party, the report will be submitted to the court and considered on such evidence
as the court considers relevant." Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1305(a). This
section is substantially identical to prior law. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4309 (West
1955).
The court may confirm the report if it finds it to be reasonable. If the report is not
confirmed or if a majority of the appraisers fail to make and file a report within the time
allowed by the court, the court will determine the fair market value of the dissenting
shares. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1305(b). This section also is substantially
identical to prior law. See CAL. Corn'. CoDE ANN. § 4310 (West 1955).
A judgment will be rendered against the corporation for payment of the fair market
value of the dissenting shares of any dissenting shareholder who is a party to the action
or who has intervened. This judgment together with interest at the legal rate from the
date on which it was entered will be payable only upon the endorsement and deliveryl to
the corporation of the certificates for the shares described in the judgment. Gen'1 Crp.
Law, supra note 1, §§ 1305(c), (d). Subdivision (c) is almost identical to prior law, but
is qualified by reference to section 1306, which specifies the effect on the dissenters'
rights obligation of the GCL's restrictions on a corporation purchasing its own shares.
See CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 4311 (West 1955). Subdivision (d) is identical to prior
law. See id. § 4312.
218. Compare Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1305(e) with CAL. CORP. CoDE ANN.
§ 4313 (West 1955), which mandated that the corporation pay the costs of the action
if the appraisal exceeded the price offered by the corporation.
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required by section 1304; or (4) with the consent of the corporation
the dissenting shareholder withdraws his demand for the purchase of
dissenting shares.
7. Limitations on the Purchase of Dissenting Shares
Under prior law a corporation is permitted to purchase dissenting
shares out of stated capital or out of any surplus, subject to the qualifica-
tion that such a payment is prohibited in any case where there is
reasonable grounds for believing that after the purchase the corporation
will be unable to satisfy its debts and liabilities when they fall due.
219
The GCL qualifies a corporation's obligation to make payment for
dissenting shares, whether that obligation is created by agreement or by
a judgment rendered against the corporation, by the requirement that
payments may only be made to the extent that they would not be
prohibited by the provisions of Chapter 5 of the GCL, which establishes
limitations on corporate distributions to shareholders. °2  By virtue of
section 508, Chapter 5 does not apply to distributions by a corporation
that has elected to wind up and dissolve. Accordingly, the selling
corporation in a sale-of-assets reorganization will be permitted to make
payments for dissenting shares, provided that all known debts and
liabilities of the corporation have either been paid or adequate provision
for payment has been made.2 21 Section 1306 provides that to the extent
that these limitations prevent the payment of the fair market value to
any holder of dissenting shares, these holders become creditors of the
corporation in the amount owed them for their dissenting shares togeth-
er with interest at the legal rate until the date of payment. Further-
more, these debts are subordinate to all other creditors of the corpora-
tion in any liquidation proceeding and are payable when permissible
under the provisions of Chapter 5.
219. CAL. CoRp. CoDE ANN. §§ 1706(d), 1708 (West 1955).
220. Section 166 defines "distribution to its shareholders" as including "the transfer of
cash. .. by a corporation to its shareholders. . . or the purchase or redemption of its
shares for cash. . . ." Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 166. Section 500 prohibits a
corporation from making a distribution to its shareholders unless either the retained
earnings of the corporation equal or exceed the amount of the distribution or certain
quantitative solvency and liquidity requirements are satisfied. Id. § 500. Distributions
to shareholders are also prohibited if the corporation making the distribution is or would
thereby be unlikely to meet its liabilities as they mature. Id. § 501. For a summary
description of those limitations, see Barton, A Brief Look at the New General Corpora-
tion Law, 51 L.A.B.J. 210, 212-13 (1975); Dreyfuss, Distributions to Shareholders Un-
der the New California General Corporation Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 839, 849-56
(1976).
221. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2004. For a discussion of this subject, see
notes 261-64 infra and accompanying text.
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Although section 1300(a) imposes upon the issuer the obligation to
purchase dissenting shares, in many instances the issuer will not be in
existence when payment for dissenting shares will be made. This will
occur when the obligated company is a disappearing corporation in a
merger.222 In such a case, the obligation to pay for dissenting shares of
the disappearing corporation will fall upon the surviving corporation by
virtue of section 1107(a). In these cases, whether a payment for
dissenting shares would be prohibited by .the provisions of Chapter 5
will be determined by the application of those provisions to the surviving
corporation, rather than to the corporation that originally incurred the
obligation to make these payments.
228
In addition to the limitations on dissenters' rights purchases imposed
by Chapter 5, tax and accounting considerations will affect a corpora-
tion's ability to satisfy dissenters' rights demands. 24
222. Although it is theoretically possible for the acquiring corporation in a sale-of-
assets reorganization to assume the obligation of the selling corporation to make
payments for dissenting shares, this will ordinarily make it difficult, if not impossible, for
the transaction to satisfy the "solely for voting stock" test for a type C tax reorganiza-
tion. See note 224 infra.
223. Since the surviving corporation is in effect purchasing the dissenting shares of
the disappearing corporation rather than its own, it is arguable that this is not a "distri-
bution to shareholders" within the meaning of section 166. If this is the case, then
Chapter 5 will not affect the survivor's ability to make payments for these dissenting
shares. See Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, at §§ 166, 500-03. However, section 1107
(a) provides that the surviving corporation succeeds to the liabilities of the disappearing
corporation as if they had been incurred by the survivor. Furthermore, section 1107(b)
states that the rights of the creditors of the disappearing corporation are preserved
unimpaired. These provisions may be fairly interpreted to mean that the survivor is
subject to the same restrictions, which are for the benefit of the creditors of the disap-
pearing corporation, that were applicable to the disappearing corporation. The more
reasonable construction of the GCL appears to require the application of Chapter 5 to
these purchases.
The accounting treatment given to the combination by the surviving or acquiring
corporation may affect its ability to pay for dissenting shares. This treatment will
determine the values at which the acquired corporation's assets will be carried on the
books of the surviving or acquiring corporation, the retained earnings account of the
surviving or acquiring corporation, and the historical operating results of this corpora-
tion. See text accompanying notes 310-25 infra. These factors will in turn affect the
corporation's ability to satisfy the income statement and balance sheet tests imposed on
shareholder distributions by the GCL. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 500, 502-03;
see id. § 114.
224. The extension of dissenters' rights to all forms of business combinations involv-
ing the issuance of equity securities may have an impact upon the characterization of
certain of these transactions as tax-free reorganizations for federal income tax purposes.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(C). More specifically, the ex-
ercise of dissenters' rights by shareholders of the acquired corporation may interfere
with such characterization in the following respects: (1) the acquisition by shareholders
of the acquired corporation of a sufficient equity interest in the acquiring corporation in
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8. Dissenters' Rights as an Exclusive Remedy
Both prior law and section 1312(a) provide that a shareholder
entitled to dissenters' rights will not be permitted to attack the validity of
a combination or to have it rescinded or set aside.
22r This concept of
dissenters' rights as an exclusive remedy under prior law has received
judicial approval.2 2 6  The one express qualification to this principle
under the GCL, which also appears in prior law, is that it does not
preclude an action to test whether the reorganization has received the
requisite shareholder approval.
Section 1312(b) introduces a new qualification to the concept that
dissenters' rights are exclusive. This concept is not applicable to a
reorganization or short-form merger where one of the parties is con-
trolled by or under common control with another party to the trans-
action.2 27  Dissenters' rights are thus not the exclusive remedy of a
shareholder of a controlled corporation unless he elects this remedy.
As a consequence of section 1312(b) such a shareholder will not be
precluded from attacking the validity of a combination that has re-
ceived the requisite shareholder approval. This is consistent with the
trend of California authorities which permit, if not encourage, a court
to review corporate transactions involving affiliates for their overall
order to satisfy the judicially imposed "continuity of interest" doctrine; (2) the acquisi-
tion by the acquiring corporation of sufficient assets of the acquired corporation in order
to satisfy the requirement that "substantially all of the properties" be acquired in a
reorganization characterized under INT. REV CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(C); and (3)
the transfer to the acquired corporation by the acquiring corporation of no consideration
other than its voting stock in order to satisfy the requirement that an acquisition
characterized as a reorganization under section 368(a) (1) (C) of the INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 be "solely for voting stock." See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EusnCE, FE DEAL IN-
comm TAxAaox OF ConrOnTioNs AND SHARMOLDERS, 14.01-.57 (3d ed. 1971);
Kringel, Preventing a Dissenting Stockholder from Destroying a Tax-Free Reorganiza-
tion, 31 J. TAX. 138-42 (1969).
See note 223 supra and text accompanying notes 310-25 infra for a discussion of the
effect of dissenters' rights on the accounting treatment given a business combination.
225. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4123 (West 1955).
226. Beechwood See. Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1939);
Giannini Controls Corp. v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. App. 2d 142, 49 Cal. 'Rptr. 643
(1966).
227. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1312(b) provides that:
If one of the parties to the reorganization or short-form merger is directly or
indirectly controlled by, or under common control with, another party to the re-
organization or merger, [the concept of exclusivity] shall not apply to any share-
holder of such party who has not demanded payment in cash for such shareholder's
shares pursuant to the [dissenters' rights provisions]; but if the shareholder institutes
any action to attack the validity of the reorganization or short-form merger or to
have the reorganization or short-form merger set aside or rescinded, the shareholder
shall not thereafter have any right [to assert dissenters' rights].
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fairness to the parties who may be disadvantaged by the affiliation. 2 '
The potential severity of this section is moderated by the requirement
that in any action attacking the validity of a reorganization or short-form
merger, the court may not restrain or enjoin the consummation of the
transaction without giving ten days prior notice to the corporation and
finding that it is clear that no other remedy will adequately protect the
complaining shareholder or the class he represents.22 9
F. Additional Requirements and Considerations
1. Fairness and Combinations Involving Affiliated Parties
Although not a part of the dissenters' rights procedure, Chapter 13 of
the GCL contains a provision which, like dissenters' rights, is designed
to assure fair treatment to minority shareholders in business combina-
tions by placing on the party in control the burden of proving that the
transaction is just and reasonable as to the shareholders of the controlled
party. This provision, section 1312(c), applies only to a reorganiza-
tion or short-form merger where one party is directly or indirectly
controlled by, or under common control with, another party.230 The
application of this provision to a business combination is dependent
upon a control or common control relationship existing between parties
to the combination. In this provision "control" means the possession of
the direct or indirect power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a corporation.2 31 This is an amorphous
concept. Controlling power can arise out of a variety of economic and
personal relationships. Obvious economic relationships that may give
228. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969).
229. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1312(b).
230. By definition the parent will control a merging subsidiary in any short-form
merger. ee Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 160(a), 1110(b). In such a transaction,
section 1312(c) requires that in any action to attack the validity of the reorganization or
short-form merger or to have it set aside or rescinded
(1) a party to a reorganization or short-form merger which controls another party
to the reorganization or short-form merger shall have the burden of proving that
the transaction is just and reasonable as to the shareholders of the controlled party,
and (2) a person who controls two or more parties to a reorganization shall have
the burden of proving that the transaction is just and reasonable as to the share-
holders of any party so controlled.
Id. § 1312(c). Under Delaware law, the dominant corporation in a merger must
carry the burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dnnhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (-Del. 1968); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del.), affg 89 A.2d 862 (Del. 1952). The
Delaware authorities on this point are well reviewed in FOLK, supra note 154, at 333-39.
231. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 160(a).
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rise to control include those of shareholder and corporation, creditor and
debtor, and supplier and customer. Familial and other interpersonal
relationships can also create control influences which are very difficult
to evaluate. Since it is not always easy to determine whether or not a
control or common control relationship exists or to predict whether a
court will conclude that it exists, section 1312(c) injects an element of
uncertainty into some business combinations.
Section 1312(c) appears to be primarily a codification of the concept
that in a transaction involving a controlling person and a controlled
corporation, the controlling person must deal fairly with the controlled
entity.232 In any such transaction, the controlling person will be treated
as a fiduciary to the controlled entity and to all of its shareholders. As
a consequence, in any action in which the conduct of a controlling
person vis-h-vis the corporation and its shareholders is called into
question, the controlling person must justify the fairness of the transac-
tion to all of the shareholders of the corporation.288
Section 310(a), the GCL's general rule of validation for transactions
between corporations and directors and director affiliates, may also apply
to a reorganization or short-form merger involving parties as to which a
control or common control relationship exists.28 4  This section deals
with a transaction between two or more corporations in which a director
of one has a material financial interest in the other.235 It provides that
this affiliation will not be a basis for attacking the transaction if any one
of three specified procedures for validating the transaction is followed.
The first procedure is the disclosure of all of the material facts as to the
transaction and the director's interest to the shareholders of the corpora-
232. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969); DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (1975); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148
(1964); cf. Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969);
Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964). See also
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.
1955). The concept of requiring an interested party to establish the fairness of a
transaction with the corporation is an outgrowth of the adoption in 1931 of the
predecessor to CAL. CoRe. CODE ANN. § 820 (West 1955). Prior to 1931 the law
absolutely prohibited any transaction between a director and his corporation. See
H. BALLANN & G. STERLING, CALIORNU CORPORATION LA. Ws § 78.01 (4th ed. 1966).
234. See note 154 infra for a discussion of the application of Gen'l Corp. Law, supra
note 1, § 310 to a short-form merger. Id. § 310(b) applies to transactions between
corporations with one or more common directors but who have no material financial
interest in either corporation.
235. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 310(a) provides that a mere common director-
ship does not constitute a material financial interest.
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tion and approval by the shareholders of the transaction in good faith,
with the shares owned by the interested director not being entitled to
vote.2 6 The second procedure is disclosure of the same facts to the
board or a committee of the board and authorization, approval or
ratification of the transaction by the board or such committee in good
faith by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the interested
director or directors, provided that the transaction is also just and
reasonable to the corporation at the time of its authorization, approval
or ratification.237 Third, the affiliation will not render the transaction
void or voidable if the person asserting the validity of the transaction
sustains the burden of proving that it was just and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time it was authorized, approved or ratified.23s
Section 1312(c) operates independently of section 310(a). Thus,
use of either the first or second validation procedures established by
section 310(a) will not affect the application of section 1312(c) to the
transaction. However, the third method of validation and section
1312(c) are quite similar, and satisfaction of one may result in compli-
ance with the other. The principal difference between the two is that
section 310(a) refers to the fairness of the transaction to the corporation
while section 1312(c) refers to the fairness of the transaction to the
shareholders of the corporation. 89
One unfortunate aspect of section 1312(c) is that it does not permit a
validating procedure to avoid shifting the burden of establishing the
fairness of a combination. A control or common control relationship
between two parties to a reorganization may not be sufficient to assure
the shareholder approval required by Chapter 12. Therefore, it would
236. Id. § 310(a)(1). "Approved by the shareholders" means generally approved
by the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote represented at a
meeting at which a quorum is present. Id. § 153.
237. Id. § 310(a)(2). An interested director may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board or a committee which authorizes,
approves or ratifies a transaction in which that director is interested. Id. § 3 10(c).
238. Id. § 310(a)(3).
239. The distinction between these two concepts is not entirely clear. When will a
combination be fair to a controlled party but not to the shareholders of that party?
Perhaps an issuance of shares in an acquisition would not affect the fairness of the
transaction to the issuer but would affect its shareholders. However, the acquisition of
an unprofitable or marginally profitable business could directly affect the acquiring
corporation's business as well as the interests of its shareholders. It is unlikely that a
transaction will be fair to the shareholders of a corporation but not to the corporation
itself. The distinction between fairness to shareholders and to the corporation is prob-
ably not an important one because in all likelihood a controlling party will have to
justify that a transaction is just and reasonable to both the corporation and its share-
holders.
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seem unnecessary to require the burden to shift in any transaction
approved by the shareholders of a controlled party or party under
common control, so long as the control relationship is fully disclosed to
the shareholders and the combination is approved by a sufficient share-
holder vote without counting the shares held by the controlling party or
person. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to count the shares
held by the controlling party or person if a majority or some higher
proportion of the shares held by noncontrolling shareholders also ap-
prove the transaction.
Section 1312(b) contains a feature which may tend to reduce the
likelihood of section 1312(c) being used as a basis for enjoining the
consummation of a combination. An injunction or order prohibiting
such a combination may not be issued without ten days prior notice to
the corporation and in any case only if the court determines that it is
clear that no other remedy will adequately protect the claimant or the
class of shareholders of which he is a member.240 This feature may in
part counterbalance the possibly harsh result which can ensue from the
operation of section 1312(c). Even a tenuously based assertion of
unfairness can produce a costly settlement if it results in a temporary
restraining order that blocks the closing of a combination where timing
is critical. This statutory limitation on enjoining the consummation of
combinations will tend to deter the type of attack that must depend
upon extortionary circumstances rather than merit for its effectiveness.
2. Treatment of Fractional Share Interests
Whatever the form of a transaction, a business combination that in-
volves the issuance of securities requires the allocation of these securities
among the intended ultimate recipients. In the case of a merger or an
exchange reorganization, the terms of the transaction will ordinarily
specify an exchange ratio to accomplish this allocation. However, in
a sale-of-assets reorganization the terms will typically contain only the
aggregate number of shares or units of securities to be issued without
specifying the allocation of this consideration among the security holders
of the acquired corporation. As a part of the winding up and dissolu-
tion of this corporation, however, the securities received will be dis-
tributed among its shareholders.
Unless this allocation process results in an exchange ratio in which
each recipient will receive a full share or shares for each share surren-
240. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1312(b).
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dered, fractional share interests will be produced. As in the case of
prior law, the GCL permits the issuance of fractional shares, but this is
rarely if ever done.241 Section 407 specifies four methods for dealing
with fractional interests in a business combination. First, arrangements
may be made for those persons who are entitled to fractional shares to
dispose of these interests. 2 2  This is usually accomplished by giving
these persons the option of either selling their interest for cash or turning
this interest into a full share by purchasing for cash a reciprocal frac-
tional interest. To the extent possible these purchase and sale orders
will be matched. If options to sell exceed the options to buy, the excess
shares will ordinarily be sold in the open market. Conversely, if the
purchases outbalance the sales, the excess will be satisfied by open
market purchases. The issuing corporation can also deal with excess
fractions by paying cash for fractions offered for sale or issuing addi-
tional shares to satisfy purchase offers.
The second method for dealing with fractional interests, and probably
the least in current use, is the issuance of warrants or scrip that entitle
the holder to receive a full share upon the surrender of warrants or scrip
aggregating a full share.243  These warrants or scrip do not truly
evidence a fractional share because they generally do not carry voting or
dividend rights, they do not participate in distributions upon liquidation
of the issuing corporation, and they usually become void if they are not
surrendered for a full share before a specified date.2 44 This procedure
is administratively cumbersome and its attendant cost ordinarily out-
weighs any benefits. For these reasons, as well as the ease of other
accepted methods of disposing of fractional interests, the issuance of
scrip and warrants is disfavored and seldom used.
The third and perhaps the most simple method of dealing with
fractional interests is for the issuer to pay cash to the persons otherwise
entitled to the fractional shares. 45 The payment must be the fair value
241. See Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 407; CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 1113 (West
Supp. 1975).
242. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 402(a).
243. Id. § 407(c).
244. Unlike prior law, all of these features of warrants and scrip are expressly
authorized by section 407 of the GCL. However, this section also authorizes the board
to grant dividend, voting and liquidation rights to the holders of scrip and warrants. As
an alternative to providing for an expiration date for scrip or warrants, the board may
require that they may be sold by the corporation and the proceeds distributed to the
holders unless they are surrendered for a full share before a specified date.
245. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 407(b). These payments would of course be
subject to the limitations on corporate share purchases contained in Chapter 5 of the
1976]
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of the fraction of a share as of the time those entitled to receive fractions
are determined. The determination by the issuer board of the fair value
of a fractional share will be conclusive in the absence of fraud. Finally,
the GCL permits fractions of a share in a merger or reorganization to be
disregarded or in a merger to provide that the shares issuable will be
rounded off to the nearest whole share. 40 This method of disposition is
not available unless the fraction any person would otherwise be entitled
to receive represents less than one-half of one percent of the total
number of shares that person will receive in the transaction.
3. Winding Up and Dissolution
A sale-of-assets reorganization will typically be followed by a volun-
tary winding up and dissolution of the acquired corporation in order to
facilitate the distribution to its shareholders of the securities received,
247
and because there is usually no longer any reason for the entity to
remain in existence.24 8 Section 1900(a) provides that the voluntary
election to wind up and dissolve must be made by the vote of the holders
of shares representing at least fifty percent of the voting power. This vote
will ordinarily be taken at the time of any vote required for approval of
the sale-of-assets reorganization. Typically these two matters are com-
GCL. See note 220 supra for a brief discussion of these limitations. The GCL also
prohibits the payment of cash for fractional shares if this would result in the cancellation
of more than ten percent of the outstanding shares of any class. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra
note 1, § 407. This prohibition is part of the GCL policy of preventing a cash squeeze-
out of a greater than ten percent minority interest. A reverse stock split of enormous
proportion can leave minority shareholders with only fractional share interests which
could be eliminated by cash payment. In the absence of this limitation, the reverse
split coupled with cash payments for fractional interests could be used to eliminate a
minority interest that could not be eliminated in a merger under either sections 1101
or 1110.
246. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 1101, 1110.
247. The limitations on distributions to shareholders contained in Chapter 5 of the
GCL, id. §§ 500-10, do not apply to proceedings for winding up and dissolution in
accordance with either Chapter 18, id. §§ 1800-09 (involuntary proceedings), or Chap-
ter 19, id. §§ 1900-07 (voluntary proceedings). Id. § 508. It may be impractical if not
impossible to distribute the securities received in compliance with the limitations appear-
ing in Chapter 5. Upon any failure to so comply, any director who approves a
distribution of assets to shareholders that is contrary to the provisions of sections 500-
03 risks both civil and criminal liability. Id. §§ 316(a)(1), 2253. See note
261 infra for a discussion of director responsibility in connection with distributions
to shareholders in a proceeding for winding up and dissolution.
248. A sale-of-assets reorganization entails the sale of all or substantially all of a
corporation's assets. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 181(c). Accordingly, after the




bined into a single proposition to be voted upon at a meeting of
shareholders, since the approval of one but not the other is obviously
pointless. The majority modified class vote required for approval of the
reorganization will of course encompass the fifty percent non-class vote
required for the election to wind up and dissolve. Naturally, the articles
may provide for the vote of a greater proportion of the shares in order to
make this election, may also grant a vote on this subject to shares that do
not vote for directors, and may require the affirmative vote of one or
more classes or series in order for the election to be made.249
Once the election has been made, a certificate of election must be
filed with the Secretary of State.250 Nevertheless, the election may be
revoked before any distribution of assets to the shareholders by the vote
of the holders of shares representing a majority of the voting power of
the corporation. 251  This requirement for shareholder approval to re-
voke a voluntary election might produce complications if the reorganiza-
tion is not consummated after the shareholder approval is given. Will
additional shareholder action be required in such a case to revoke the
election to wind up and dissolve? The answer to this question should
be in the negative, but the provisions of the GCL do not readily indicate
this result.252  The clear intent of shareholder adoption of a voluntary
249. Id. § 204(a)(5).
250. Id. § 1901(a). The certificate must either be an officers' certificate, id. §
173, or must be signed and verified by at least a majority of the directors then in office
or by a shareholder authorized to do so by shareholders holding the minimum number of
shares required to approve the voluntary election to wind up and dissolve. Id. §
1901(b). In the case of an election incident to a sale-of-assets reorganization the
certificate must set forth: (1) that the corporation has elected to wind up and dissolve,
(2) the number of shares voting for the election and that the election was made by
shareholders representing at least fifty percent of the voting power of the corporation,
(3) if the certificate is executed by a shareholder, that the shareholder was authorized to
do so by shareholders holding the requisite number of shares needed to approve the
voluntary election. Id.
251. Id. § 1902(a). n the event of such a revocation a certificate evidencing the
revocation must be signed, verified, and filed in the same manner as the certificate of
election. Id. The requirements for the certificate of revocation appear in id. §
1902(b).
252. Voluntary proceedings for winding up commence with the adoption of the
resolution of shareholders. Id. § 1903(a). When such a voluntary proceeding has
commenced, the corporation must cease to carry on business except to the extent that
this is necessary to preserve its good will or going-concern value pending sale of its
business and assets. Id. § 1903(c). Notwithstanding the apparent finality of this
provision, section 1201(f) states that the board may abandon a proposed reorganization
without further action by shareholders. By implication this should permit the board
alone to abandon a voluntary proceeding of dissolution that is obviously dependent upon
and subsumed by the reorganization.
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election as a part of approving a sale-of-assets reorganization is to
discontinue the corporation's business and distribute its assets only if the
reorganization is consummated. It would serve no useful purpose to
require additional shareholder action to revoke the election if the reor-
ganization is abandoned.253
Upon the making of the election, the corporation must cease doing
business other than to the extent necessary to preserve its value pending
completion of the sale.2 4  During the period after the election the
board continues to act as the board and has full power to wind up and
settle the corporation's affairs.215  The board must notify all sharehold-
ers who did not vote in favor of the election 50 and all known creditors
and claimants257 of the corporation of the commencement of the pro-
ceedings to wind up and dissolve. Although these proceedings are
normally conducted by an officer or officers under supervision of the
board,258 upon petition by an appropriate person a court may take
jurisdiction over the proceedings if it determines this is necessary for
the protection of any party in interest.25 9 A petition to institute judicial
supervision of voluntary winding up and dissolution proceedings may be
made by the corporation, one or more shareholders holding at least five
percent of the shares of any class, any shareholder if the corporation
is a close corporation, or any three or more creditors.20 °
253. Prudence would dictate that the shareholder resolution approving the voluntary
election specify that the election will not become effective unless and until the sale-of-
assets reorganization is completed. In addition, the certificate of election should not be
filed until the election becomes effective in accordance with this resolution.
254. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1903 (c).
255. Id. § 1903(b). This power continues even after the filing of the certificate of
dissolution. Id. Section 2001 enumerates some of the powers and duties of directors
and officers after commencement of dissolution proceedings.
256. Id. § 1903 (c). This notice will probably be a part of the notice of approval of
the reorganization by the shareholders which section 1301(a) requires must be sent to all
shareholders if any shareholder would have dissenters' rights. Id. § 1301(a).
257. Id. § 1903(c). This section only requires notice to creditors whose addresses
appear on the corporation's records. This notice will ordinarily take the form of a press
release, letter or memorandum sent to customers, employees, suppliers, and other
creditors, announcing completion of the reorganization. The announcement will be
couched in terms of the business and assets of the corporation having been acquired by
the acquiring company, which will continue this business and endeavor to maintain and
foster the close business relationships of its predecessor. Somewhere in the public
relations jargon will be a statement to the effect that the corporation has decided to wind
up and dissolve and is going out of business.
258. See note 255 supra and accompanying text.
259. Genl Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1904.
260. Id.
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The securities received in the reorganization may only be distributed
to the shareholders after the board has determined that all known debts
and liabilities have been paid or adequate provision for payment has
been made.26 This requirement will typically be satisfied by having the
acquiring corporation undertake to pay, perform, and discharge all of
the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation. 262  If assets are
distributed without a court order and without the required payment or
provision, the corporation may recover any asset distributed to any
shareholder of the corporation?6 3  An action to recover assets improp-
erly distributed may be brought in the name of the corporation by any
creditor of the corporation, whether or not the creditor's claim has been
reduced to judgment.
26 4
261. See id. §§ 2004, 2009, 316(a)(2). Section 2004 states that the board must
distribute the remaining corporate assets to its shareholders after it has made this
determination. The conclusion that no distribution may be made without payment or
adequate provision for all known debts and liabilities is based upon a reading of sections
2009 and 316(a) (2). Section 2009 permits creditors to recover from shareholders assets
distributed in the absence of the required prior payment or adequate provision for
payment, and section 316(a) (2) imposes civil liability on directors who approve such a
distribution, subject to a showing that the directors acted in conformity with the standard
of care imposed by section 309. Shareholders and directors may also incur responsibility
for improper distributions under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 3439-3439.12 (West 1970).
262. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2005. A practical problem occasionally will be
created because the acquiring corporation will usually be unwilling to assume undisclosed
liabilities of the selling corporation that are material in amount. How can the require-
ment for payment or adequate provision be satisfied in such a case? Two approaches
have proved to be effective. In one approach the acquiring corporation will assume
disclosed contingent claims and perhaps undisclosed claims if it receives adequate
assurances that it will not suffer any loss if a claim should arise. The assurance may
take the form of escrowing a portion of the shares to be issued or contractual indemnity
from a financially responsible person, perhaps one or more large shareholders of the
corporation being acquired.
The other approach is for the selling corporation to hold back from distribution to its
shareholders a sufficient amount of the securities received to satisfy the known contin-
gent liabilities. Additionally, there is a mechanism for depositing funds with a bank or
the State Treasurer for the satisfaction of claims if the claimant is unknown or the
existence or amount of the claim is contingent. Id. § 2008(a). The flexibility of this
mechanism has been expanded over predecessor provisions of the prior law, which appear
in CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 5010-11 (West Supp. 1975). For a discussion of the
indemnity and escrow techniques, including some of the tax and accounting consequences
of their use, see J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 365-70, 382-88 (1975). For a
discussion as to whether and the extent to which the acquiring corporation can avoid
assuming certain liabilities and obligations of the acquired corporation, see Orlanski, The
Avoidance of the Assumption of Liabilities in "Stock for Assets" Acquisitions, 45 L.A.B.
BuLL. 361 (1970).
263. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2009(a).
264. Id. § 2009(b). Prior law required the action to be brought by the corporation
or by its receiver, liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 5012
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Distribution of the securities received in a reorganization ordinarily
poses no problem if the corporation has only outstanding common
shares. 265  The terms of outstanding options, warrants, and convertible
debt securities usually specify the disposition of these interests in the
event of a sale of assets. The usual treatment of these interests is to
have the acquiring corporation assume the issuer's obligations. 206 In
the case of employee stock options, most plans under which these
securities are issued provide that unexercised options will expire on the
effective date of the reorganization unless the acquiring corporation
assumes the issuer's obligation or provides a substitute option. 20 7
If a corporation also has outstanding preferred shares, the distribution
of the securities received may be somewhat more complicated. In some
instances the terms of convertible preferred shares will provide in effect
that the shares are treated as having been converted. This treatment is
sometimes conditioned upon a majority or some higher percentage of
this class or series of shares approving the reorganization. Distribution
of the required securities may then proceed as if only one class of shares
was outstanding. Alternatively, -the terms of the preferred shares may
specify a type of preferred share of an acquiring corporation that may
be distributed in satisfaction of the liquidation preferences of these pre-
ferred shares. If the securities received in the reorganization include
preferred shares that meet these requirements, distribution of the securi-
ties received will usually not pose a problem.208
(West 1955). This required creditors to institute proceedings for the appointment of a
receiver, liquidator, or trustee rather than proceeding directly against the recipient of the
wrongful distribution.
265. The GCL requires that all of the remaining assets of the corporation must be
distributed among its shareholders according to their respective rights and preferences.
Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2004. Unless the articles provide otherwise, assets will
be distributed among the shareholders in the proportion that their respective sharehold-
ings bear to the total of all shareholdings. See id. § 203.
266. The related trust indenture for convertible debt securities will often permit a sale-
of-assets by the issuing corporation if the purchasing corporation executes a supplemental
indenture or other contractual undertaking to assume the issuer's obligations, including
the obligation to issue shares upon exercise of the conversion privilege. In some
instances, usually in the case of privately placed debt securities, the indenture or
purchase agreement will prohibit the sale-of-assets unless prior approval of a specified
percentage of the outstanding principal amount of the debt securities is sought and
obtained. Occasionally, the issuing corporation can nevertheless accomplish the reorgan-
ization by prepaying the debt securities, but in other cases the holders of these securities
may be able to block the reorganization unless their demands are met.
267. These options usually permit exercise only in installments over a period of years
of employment in order to provide an incentive for continuing service. In the event of a
reorganization the installment feature is automatically waived to permit these options to
be exercised in full.
268. This type of preferred share is very unusual because of the difficulty of
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However, in many instances the satisfaction of liquidation preferences
of outstanding preferred shares cannot be so neatly handled. In these
cases the liquidation preference usually requires a cash payment before
any distribution can be made to holders of junior shares. For tax and
financial reasons cash payments in satisfaction of all of these preferences
usually cannot be made.269 Like prior law, the GCL contains a proce-
dure to deal with liquidation preferences and the distribution of securi-
ties under these circumstances . 7  A distribution of assets which is not
in accordance with the liquidation preferences of preferred shares may
be made if provision for this is made in a plan of distribution adopted by
the board and approved by a majority of the outstanding shares of each
class regardless of any limitation or restriction on voting.271 The plan
may provide that the distribution is in complete or partial satisfaction of
the rights of any class or series of shares upon distribution and liquida-
tion of the assets. 2
Within twenty days after adoption of a plan of distribution, notice of
adoption must be given by mail to all holders of shares having liquida-
tion preferences.2 7 3  Once adopted the plan will be binding upon all
shareholders, except that holders of shares with a liquidation preference
who dissent from the plan may elect to receive a cash payment in the
amount of the liquidation preference of their preferred shares. 4  This
election must be made by filing a written demand within thirty days
after the date the notice of adoption was mailed.275
conceptualizing, at the time the original terms are being prepared, the type of security of
an unknown issuer that would be acceptable in the future. Drafting such provisions,
therefore, is often impractical if not impossible. However, even when this type of
preferred share exists, the liquidation preference will usually include accrued and unpaid
dividends, which, absent specific agreement, cannot be satisfied by the issuance of shares.
Accordingly, in such a case the corporation will have to retain sufficient cash to pay
these accrued dividends.
269. The retention of cash to satisfy these liabilities may prevent the transaction from
meeting the "substantially all" requirement of a type C tax reorganization for federal
income tax purposes. See note 224 supra. Additionally, such payments will deplete the
cash assets that would otherwise be transferred to the acquiring corporation, in some
cases without a corresponding adjustment in the number of shares or units of securities
that will be issued in the reorganization.
270. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2007; CAL. Coat. CODE ANN. §§ 5004-08
(West 1955).
271. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2007(a). The required shareholder vote is
"approval of the outstanding shares." The meaning of this phrase is discussed in text
accompanying note 40 supra.
272. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2007(a).
273. Id. § 2007(b).
274. Id. § 2007(c).
275. Id.
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If a demand for cash is filed, the board, in its discretion, may
abandon an adopted plan without shareholder approval, in which case
the election will not be effective and the shareholders will then be
entitled to receive the assets in accordance with their rights and prefer-
ences upon liquidation. 76  It should be noted that a preferred share-
holder is apparently not entitled to a choice between payment of his
preference upon liquidation and dissenters' rights because these latter
rights are withheld from shares that specify an amount payable in the
event of a reorganization.27
For apparent reasons, if a corporation has outstanding preferred
shares, the vote on any required plan of distribution should be taken at
the time of the vote on the reorganization and election to wind up and
dissolve. Additionally, these matters should form a single proposal for
shareholder action since approval of less than all of these items could
produce chaotic results. The required notice of adoption of the plan of
distribution should probably be sent along with the required notice of
approval of the reorganization 7 8 since the mailing of each notice marks
the beginning of a thirty day period within which shareholders may elect
to be paid cash for their shares. 9 If these demands exceed the amount
permitted by the acquisition agreement, the reorganization and plan of
distribution can be abandoned.8 0
The complications attendant to dealing with preferred shares in a
winding up and dissolution proceeding following a sale-of-assets reor-
ganization often dictate the use of a merger reorganization to effect the
acquisition of a corporation with outstanding preferred shares. The
agreement of merger will specify the consideration to be issued in
exchange for the preferred shares.2 81 If the merger reorganization is
276. Id. § 2007(d).
277. Id. § 1311. This section provides that the dissenters' rights provisions are not
applicable to shares whose terms and provisions specifically set forth the amount to be
paid in respect of such shares in the event of a reorganization or merger. The reference
to "reorganization" will have to be read to include the consequent dissolution in a sale-
of-assets reorganization in order for this provision to preclude a preferred shareholder
from having both dissenters' rights under Chapter 13, id. §§ 1301-12, as well as his
rights as a dissenter from a plan of distribution under section 2007(c). It would be
pointless to accord both protective features to a preferred shareholder.
278. Id. § 1301(a).
279. Id. §§ 2007(c), 1301(b). The thirty day period obviously has no application to
dissenters' rights for marketable securities. See id. § 1301(b).
280. For a discussion of the possible problem incident to revoking a voluntary election
if the reorganization is not consummated, see notes 252-53 supra and accompanying
text.
281. Many preferred share contracts specify that a merger or consolidation will not
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approved by the requisite vote of each class or series, the holders of
these preferred shares will be required to accept this consideration unless
they exercise any dissenters' rights to which they are entitled. If the
preferred shares are subject to the marketable securities exception from
dissenters' rights, no cash will have to be paid out for these shares.28 2
Additionally, even if this exception is not available, if the preferred
shares are themselves marketable securities,2 83 the special requirements
for perfecting dissenters' rights for these shares may tend to minimize
the demands and consequently the cash that will have to be paid for
these shares.
284
After the corporation has completed the distribution of its assets to
shareholders and has otherwise been completely wound up, a certificate
of dissolution must be filed with the Secretary of State.2 5  A precondi-
tion to the filing of such a certificate is the filing of a certificate issued
by the Franchise Tax Board to the effect that all taxes imposed by the
Bank and Corporation Tax Law have been paid or secured.28 6 An
undertaking from the acquiring corporation to pay these taxes is usually
sufficient to obtain this certificate. Upon the filing of the certificate
of dissolution the existence of the corporation ceases except for the pur-
pose of further winding up if needed.28 7
trigger the liquidation preference requirements. Additionally, a number of courts in
other states have construed liquidation preference provisions as being inapplicable to
merger or consolidation proceedings even in the absence of a specific provision to this
effect. Some of these cases are cited in Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Drafts-
manship, 42 CALIF. L. RFv. 243, 261 (1954).
282. Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(b)(1).
283. The term "marketable securities" is a defined term in this article. See note 198
supra.
284. See Gen'1 Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(b) (2) which requires that marketable
securities must be voted against the reorganization in order to perfect dissenters' rights
for these shares; id. § 1301(b) which requires that the demand to perfect dissenters'
rights for marketable securities be received no later than the date of the shareholders'
meeting to vote on the reorganization.
285. Id. § 1905(a). This section also specifies the requirements for the certificate
of dissolution which must be signed by a majority of the directors then in office. As an
alternative to filing the certificate of dissolution the board may petition for a judicial
declaration that the corporation is duly wound up and dissolved. Id. § 1907.
286. Id. § 1905(b).
287. Id. The GCL provides that a corporation that is dissolved nevertheless continues
for the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting or defending actions by or against
it, enabling it to collect and discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property,
and collect and divide its assets. Further, no action or proceeding to which the
corporation is a party abates as a result of the dissolution or proceedings for winding up
and dissolution. Assets omitted from the winding up continue in the dissolved corpora-
tion for the benefit of the persons entitled to these assets, and upon their realization they
must be distributed accordingly. Id. §§ 2010(a)-(c).
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4. Application of the "Pseudo-Foreign" Corporation Provisions
to Business Combinations
With few exceptions, prior law does not impose requirements upon
corporations organized under the laws of other jurisdictions, irrespective
of the nature and extent of a company's contacts with California.285 The
drafters of the GCL believed that it would be pointless to establish new
requirements for the protection of shareholders and creditors if these
could be avoided merely by incorporating or reincorporating in another
state. The GCL thus provides that a foreign corporation with specified
minimum contacts with California (a so-called "pseudo-foreign" corpo-
ration) will be subject to certain of the provisions of California law that
are designed to protect California shareholders and creditors.289
In order for these provisions to apply to a foreign corporation, more
than one-half of its business must be conducted in California and more
than one-half of its outstanding voting securities must be held of record
by persons having addresses in California.20 0 If a foreign corporation
meets both of these tests, certain of the provisions of the GCL, including
those dealing with the authorization and approval of reorganizations and
dissenters' rights, will apply to that corporation to the exclusion of the
laws of the state where it is incorporated. 0 1
The complete consequences of this new requirement on business
combinations involving pseudo-foreign corporations will probably not
be known for a considerable period of time, at least until the business
combination provisions of all other state laws have been examined in the
context of the GCL's requirements. Nevertheless, the following obser-
vations can be made. The pseudo-foreign corporation provision will, in
many instances, impose more stringent requirements for investor and
creditor protection on foreign corporations than the laws of the state of
288. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 830 (West 1955) (relating to indemnification
of directors and officers).
289. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2115.
290. Id. § 2115(a). More than one-half of a corporation's business is done in
California when the average of the property factor, payroll factor, and sales factor (as
defined in CAL. R~v. & TAX CODE ANN. 8H 25129, 25132, 25134 (West 1970)) of that
company exceeds fifty percent during its latest full tax year. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra
note 1, § 2115(a). This section also applies to a foreign parent corporation that does
not itself transact intrastate business in California if the parent meets the test for business
done in California through the activities of one or more subsidiary corporations. Id.
Voting securities held in the name of broker-dealers or their nominees are not treated
as outstanding for the purpose of the shareholding test. Id.
291. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2115(b). Chapters 12 and 13 of the GCL, as
well as the equal treatment and common share exchange requirements of section 1101,
will apply to a psuedo-foreign corporation with the required California contacts. Id.
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their incorporation. Additionally, it is unlikely that this provision will
create a conflict between California law and foreign law in the sense that
in a business combination one state will require a corporation to take
action that is prohibited by the other. However, there will undoubtedly
be instances in which action permitted by one law will be prohibited by
another. For example, section 1201(f) permits shareholder approval
of a reorganization either to precede or follow action by the board, but
the law of another state may require that shareholder action be taken
only after board action.
This provision will create considerable difficulties to the extent that it
is viewed by courts in California, but not by those in foreign states, as
preempting foreign law rather than as an additional law that must be
observed.292 These problems will naturally arise where the foreign law
contains different requirements than the GCL, such as where it provides
for different procedures or rights. In this connection consider the
Delaware and California dissenters' rights statutes. Delaware requires
that judicial proceedings to resolve dissenters' rights issues be adju-
dicated in Delaware courts, 293 whereas the California courts are consid-
ered to be the appropriate forum for resolving disputes under Chapter 13
of the GCL.294 In addition, a dissenter under Delaware law is entitled
to the "value" of his dissenting shares on the effective date of the
merger29 5 whereas the GCL gives a dissenting shareholder the "fair
market value" of his dissenting shares on the day preceding the first
announcement of the terms of the proposed transaction. 96 It is appar-
ent that these different procedures and standards can produce vastly
different results, but it is far from clear that a court will conclude that
following the GCL procedures and standards will obviate the necessity
for also observing the Delaware requirements.
The pseudo-foreign corporation provision has no application to any
corporation with outstanding securities listed on any national securities
exchange certified by the Commissioner of Corporations for purposes of
the exemption from qualification under the California Corporate Securi-
ties Law of 1968.29' These corporations are excluded from this provi-
292. The plain meaning of the language of section 2115(b) is that of preemption.
See text accompanying note 291 supra.
293. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1974).
294. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1304(a).
295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1974).
296. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 1300(a); see text accompanying notes 193-
98 supra.
297. Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, § 2115(e).
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sion basically on the theory that the geographical shareholder distribu-
tion requirements of these exchanges will in all likelihood preclude these
corporations from meeting the California share ownership test.
5. Transition from the Prior Law to the GCL
The GCL does not become effective until January 1, 1977.208 The
forthcoming effectiveness of the GCL naturally raises the issue of
whether the prior law or the GCL or perhaps. both will govern a
particular business combination. The GCL contains three transition
rules of general application and three rules that bear directly on business
combinations. The specific rules control to the extent that they produce
a different result than the general rules.299  The first general rule is
that the GCL applies on and after January 1, 1977 (the "effective date"
of the GCL) to all corporations existing on that date and to all actions
taken by the directors or shareholders of these corporations on and after
that date. 00 The second rule is that all the provisions of the GCL
governing acts, contracts, and other transactions by a corporation or its
directors or shareholders apply only to those acts, contracts, and transac-
tions occurring on or after the effective date, and the prior law governs
those that occurred prior to that date.801 The final general rule is that
any vote or consent by the directors or shareholders of a corporation
prior to the effective date that is in accordance with the prior law will be
effective in accordance with that law, and if any certificate or document
is required to be filed in any public office relating to that action, it may
be filed after January 1, 1977 in accordance with the prior law.
802
There are separate specific transition rules for business combinations,
shareholders' meetings and consents and voluntary winding up and
dissolution proceedings. The merger, reorganization, and dissenters'
rights provisions in Chapters 11, 12 and 13 of the GCL will, with one
exception, apply to transactions consummated after the effective date.8 °0
The one exception is that prior law will apply to a transaction if a
required shareholder approval is given prior tol that date. 804 This
exception is itself subject to a further exception. Prior law will apply to
a business combination even if a required shareholder approval of that
transaction is given after the effective date, provided that the approval is
298. Id. § 2300.
299. Id. § 2301.
300. Id. § 2301(a).
301. Id. § 2301(b).
302. Id. § 2301(c).




given at a meeting initially called for a date before January 1, 1977.805
The obvious purpose of this exception is to avoid the inadvertent
application of the GCL that would result from an unforseen postpone-
ment beyond the effective date of a shareholders' meeting called for a
date prior to the effective date. Absent this exception, a postponed
meeting, which might be occasioned by lack of a quorum or litigation,
might necessitate the restructuring of the transaction to assure compli-
ance with the GCL.
The special transition rule for the shareholders' meeting and consent
provisions of the GCL, Chapters 6 and 7, provides that the GCL will
apply to any meeting held after the effective date and to any written
consent that becomes effective after that date, as well as to any vote cast
at such a meeting or consent given for such an action.80 6 This principle
governs even though a shareholder may have executed a proxy or
written consent prior to the effective date with respect to such a meeting
or action. Nevertheless, the prior law will apply to a meeting held after
the effective date and to any vote cast if the meeting was initially called
for a date prior to the effective date and notice of that meeting was given
to the shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting.3 7
The final special transition rule applicable to business combinations
deals with voluntary winding up and dissolution proceedings. The
GCL sections dealing with these proceedings apply to any proceeding
initiated by the filing of a certificate of election after January 1, 1977.808
Prior law governs any proceeding initiated by a filing before the effec-
tive date.8
09
It is apparent that the different transition rules for reorganizations
and dissolution proceedings could result in the former being governed
by the prior law and the latter by the GCL. This will occur if
shareholder approval of a sale-of-assets and voluntary dissolution is
given just prior to the effective date, but the certificate of election is filed
after that date.
6. Accounting Considerations
Under existing generally accepted accounting principles a business
combination will be accounted for as a "pooling of interests" or as a
305. Id. Query whether increasing the length of time from the date a meeting is
called for until the date it is actually held will affect the application of this exception.
306. Id. § 2310.
307. Id.
308. Id. § 2315.
309. Id.
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"purchase," depending on the nature of the transaction and the sur-
rounding circumstances.3 10 The pooling of interests method accounts
for a combination as if no acquisition had occurred, i.e., as the uniting
of the ownership interests of two or more companies through an ex-
change of equity securities.3"' The recorded assets and liabilities of the
combining corporations are carried forward to the combined enterprise
at their recorded amounts. 312 The stockholders' equities of the combin-
ing companies are combined,31 3 and the recorded income of the combin-
ing parties for the current and all prior periods is combined and restated
as income of the continuing corporation.314
By contrast, the purchase method accounts for a combination as
acquisition of one company by "another.31 5 The acquiring corporation
records at its cost the acquired assets less liabilities assumed."' The
difference between the cost of an acquired company and the aggregate
fair value of the identifiable acquired assets less the liabilities assumed is
recorded as goodwill.3 17  The reported income of an acquiring corpora-
tion includes the operations of the acquired corporation only after
acquisition. 18  There is no restatement of the income of the acquiring
corporation to include the historical operating results of the acquired
corporation. Additionally, the goodwill arising from the excess of cost
over acquired net assets will be amortized against the future income of
the continuing corporation. 19
The accounting treatment given a business combination under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles will control the accounting and
financial attributes of the acquiring corporation for purposes of the
GCL.3 20  These attributes include the various balance sheet and operat-
310. Accounting Principles Board Opinion 16, 7 8, 2 CCH AccT. PIN. 6639-40
(1968) [hereinafter cited as APB 16]. APB 16 specifies both the requirements for the
applicability of each of these methods of accounting for business combinations as well as
the consequent accounting treatment required by each method. These requirements are
discussed in Scriggins, Business Combinations-Developments in Combining Techniques
and Constraints in Accounting Rules, 27 Bus. LAWYER 1245, 1250-55 (1972).
311. APB 16, supra note 310, 12, at 6640.
312. Id. 77f 51-52, at 6649-50.
313. Id. 53, at 6650.
314. Id. 7f 56, at 6650-51.
315. Id. 11, at 6640.
316. Id. 7j7 66-89, at 6652-56.
317. Id. 91, at 6655.
318. Id. 11, at 6640.
319. Accounting Principles Board Opinion 17, 27-31, 2 CCtt AcT. PRIN. 6665-66
(1968).
320. See Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 114, 1500-01. Section 114 provides that
all references in the GCL to financial statements and accounting items mean financial
[Vol. 9
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
ing statement accounts which are pertinent in ascertaining whether a
corporation is permitted by Chapter 5 of the GCL to pay dividends or
make other distributions to its shareholders.321 Accordingly, for exam-
ple, a reorganization which must be accounted for as a pooling of
interests will, among other things, increase the retained earnings account
of the acquiring corporation by the amount of the retained earnings of
the acquired company, thus increasing the legal source available for
shareholder distributions. Conversely, any deficit in the retained earn-
ings account of the acquired corporation will reduce the balance in the
same account of the acquiring corporation.
The pooling of interests method of accounting has been a favored and
sought after treatment. This method of accounting avoids the creation
of goodwill and its consequent amortization, and it permits an acquiring
corporation to include in its operating results for the fiscal period in
which the acquisition is made the operating results of the acquired
corporation for the same period. Additionally, pooling rather than
purchase accounting avoids recording the acquired assets at the acquir-
ing corporation's cost which would require higher consequent charges
for amortization and depreciation to future income than if the historical
cost to the acquired corporation were employed.
For these and other reasons many business combinations are struc-
tured to satisfy the conditions for pooling of interests accounting. 3 22 The
GCL's extension of dissenters' rights to all forms of business combina-
tions involving the issuance of equity securities may create a problem in
satisfying one of the conditions to the pooling of interests treatment.
This condition requires that the acquiring corporation issue only voting
common stock in exchange for substantially all of the voting common
statements and accounting items prepared or determined in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and fairly presenting the matters which they purport to
present, unless a specific accounting treatment is required by a particular provision. This
section also provides that references to financial statements of corporations with subsidi-
aries will generally mean consolidated financial statements for the corporation and such
of its subsidiaries as are required or permitted to be included in such consolidated
statements under generally accepted accounting principles, and references to accounting
items for such corporations mean such items determined on a consolidated basis in
accordance with such consolidated financial statements. Compare id. § 114 with CAL.
CORP. CODE ANN. §§3905, 4117 (West Supp. 1975) which permitted an acquiring
corporation in a sale-of-assets or merger to increase its earned or paid-in surplus by the
amounts appearing on the books of the acquired corporation to the extent that this was
permitted by generally accepted accounting principles. In this connection, it should be
noted that the 3CL generally eliminates all concepts of par value, capital, paid-in
surplus, and reduction surplus.
321. See Gen'l Corp. Law, supra note 1, §§ 500, 502-03.
322. These requirements appear in APB 16, 45-59, supra note 310, at 6645-49.
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stock interest of the acquired corporation. 28 The "substantially all" test
will be met if at least ninety percent of the acquired corporation's voting
common stock interest is acquired for voting common stock of the ac-
quiring corporation.8 24 The exercise of dissenters' rights by sharehold-
ers of the acquired corporation naturally reduces the interests acquired
for voting common stock and can therefore prevent the combination
from meeting the ninety percent test. Additionally, the extent of the
exercise of dissenters' rights by shareholders of the acquiring corporation
may also prevent pooling of interests treatment. 2 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The objective of the project that produced the GCL was to modernize
and streamline California corporate law in order to facilitate the conduct
of modem corporate business while maintaining and expanding the
protection of shareholder and creditor rights.8 28  By any reasonable
standard, the GCL has achieved this objective in the area of business
combinations.
The conceptual approach of the GCL to business combinations has
been to establish and apply shareholder safeguards on the basis of need
rather than on the basis of the form of the transaction. The logic of this
approach is self-evident, and the implementation of this concept has
been both thoughtful and consistent. Consistency in application has
yielded when required by the dictates of reason, thus heeding Emerson's
famous admonition about foolish consistency. 27 For example, the
section 1201(b) voting power dilution exception to shareholder approv-
al could not rationally be applied to preclude shareholder action when
fundamental changes in shareholder rights might occur, and for this
reason the exceptions to this exception appearing in sections 1201 (c),
(d) and (e) are appropriate.
The GCL has identified and resolved in a responsible way significant
conflicts between corporate necessity and shareholder protection. The
equal treatment and common share exchange requirements of section
1101 are two examples of what appears .to be a good balance between
the competing needs of modem corporate enterprises and the needs of
323. Id. 47b, at 6646.
324. Id.
325. See i. 1 47c, at 6648.
326. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 1.
327. "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen
and philosophers and divines." Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self Reliance (1841), in AMER-
ICAN POETRY AND PROSE 441 (5th ed. 1970).
[Vol. 9
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
shareholders and creditors. This balance and the means by which it has
been achieved may well have placed California in the forefront of
modem state corporation laws for many years to come.
Nevertheless, it appears that the GCL may not be the final word in
the regulation of California corporations and their activities. Green v.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc'2 8 and Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.32 9 may
be precursors of a major body of judicially formulated, federal corporate
law. It would be naive to advocate that federal law should not affect
the activities of state chartered corporations. There are many areas
where Congress has mandated that the national interest justifies federal
action, and in the regulation of the issuance of securities and securities
markets federal law is an accepted fact of corporate life. Regardless of
the extent to which one may agree or disagree with the results in Green
and Marshel, the logic of those decisions raises a very fundamental
question: Will federal courts preempt state regulation of corporate
affairs that touch upon securities matters, through a process of finding
"inherent fraud" and a consequent violation of rule 10b-5?
This type of federal intervention would be extremely unfortunate. It
would subject corporate action to a significant degree of uncertainty
because the validity of a transaction would depend upon the varying
concepts of fairness held by various members of the federal judiciary.
This is not meant as a criticism of the judgment of federal courts but
rather as an observation that a substantial degree of subjectivity would
be injected into any decision on the validity of a corporate transaction
which touches on a securities matter. Even more troublesome than this
uncertainty is the stifling effect that federal judicial action of this type
may have on the development of state legislative and judicial solutions to
complex legal corporate problems. State law must be permitted to
function if it is to evolve. In the long run, federal judicial intervention
such as Green and Marshel may prove to be counterproductive because
it will inhibit responsive state action, which is the key to effective
regulation of corporations and their controlling persons.
328. See notes 167-81 supra and accompanying text.
329. See notes 117-22 supra and accompanying text.
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